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Prosocial Antitrust
AMELIA MIAZAD†
Antitrust law is at the center of today’s public debate. It has even emerged as a rare unifying
force, with bipartisan promises to combat the concentration of economic power.
Meanwhile, the business community is grappling with mounting systematic risks arising
from climate change, income inequality, and the COVID-19 pandemic. Unexpectedly, the
largest asset managers in the world find themselves on the front lines of these battles. Due
to the rise of index investing, these “universal owners” manage portfolios that are so large
and diversified, their holdings mirror the entire economy. Their diversification protects
them against idiosyncratic risk, but greatly exposes them to systematic risks.
The universal owners are keenly aware of their exposure to these risks. They are turning
to their portfolio companies and increasing demands on directors and managers to “serve
a social purpose” and reduce their negative externalities. Public-regarding
pronouncements from CEOs of Wall Street’s biggest firms ring hollow to many shareholder
primacy loyalists. But the skeptics downplay the economic logic underlying this paradigm
shift—diversified shareholders do not want companies to externalize their negative impacts
onto the rest of the investors’ portfolios.
Many companies are rising to the challenge and making bold commitments. Some are
recognizing that, to overcome pervasive social and environmental challenges, they must
collaborate with their competitors. This Article reveals that current antitrust law is a
barrier to this collaboration and offers a policy proposal for aligning antitrust law with the
demands upon the prosocial corporation. The COVID-19 pandemic has reminded us that
we are all interconnected. Climate change will continue to deepen that understanding. The
problems we face are difficult, but they are not insurmountable. To solve them, however,
antitrust law must empower more collaboration.
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INTRODUCTION
But let us not make a fetish of competition! . . . While recognizing its value and
making strenuous efforts to [e]nsure it a fair field for its operation, let us not ignore
the fact that cooperation also has its legitimate place.
— Henry R. Seager1

Antitrust law and corporate purpose are on a collision course. Stakeholders,
including employees, communities, nonprofits, regulators, and academics are
calling on corporations “to provide profitable solutions to people or
the planet’s problems.” 2 Increasingly vociferous demands from investors for
companies to “serve a social purpose”3 have brought this concerted pressure
to a tipping point. 4 Companies are realizing that meaningful responses often
require collaboration with competitors. This places them squarely in the sights
of antitrust law.
This Article is the first to reveal that this collision-in-progress arises out of,
but is overlooked by, three pivotal debates in corporate law: corporate purpose,
universal ownership, and antitrust. This insight comes at a crucial inflection
point for antitrust and corporate law, as both loom large on the agenda of the
Biden-Harris Administration and Congress. 5 The case studies in this Article
demonstrate that, for companies, the fear of prompting antitrust enforcement is
halting progress on environmental and social crises at a time when the
private sector’s engagement is critical. 6 For instance, the specter of antitrust
enforcement is preventing the food industry from combatting the global
pollution crisis through industry-wide standards that would mandate the use
of food-grade recycled plastics.7 The same is true for the clothing industry’s
initiatives to develop mandatory, industry-wide standards to address

1. 51 CONG. REC. 13,218 (1914), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRECB-1914-pt13v51/pdf/GPO-CRECB-1914-pt13-v51-12.pdf (quoting a speech by Prof. Henry R. Seager at the Second Annual
Meeting of the Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. on Feb. 12, 1914).
2. Oxford Univ., Purpose Unlocks Profit: An Oxford Professor Discusses a Blueprint for the Reform of
Capitalism, MEDIUM (Jan. 15, 2020), https://medium.com/oxford-university/purpose-unlocks-profit8f78cfdd0e3a (quoting Colin Mayer: “The purpose of business is to solve problems profitably, and not to profit
from causing or exploiting problems.”).
3. Letter from Larry Fink, Chairman and CEO, BlackRock to CEOs, BlackRock (2018),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2018-larry-fink-ceo-letter.
4. See infra Part I.
5. See Diane Bartz & Nandita Bose, Exclusive: Biden Administration Considers Creating White House
Antitrust Czar, REUTERS (Jan. 19, 2021, 2:45 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-biden-antitrustexclusive/exclusive-biden-administration-considers-creating-white-house-antitrust-czar-sourcesidUSKBN29O2PT; see also Andy Puzder, Biden’s Assault on ‘Shareholder Capitalism’, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 17,
2020, 6:59 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bidens-assault-on-shareholder-capitalism-11597705153 (noting
that President Biden has referred to shareholder capitalism as “untrue and a farce”).
6. See infra Part IV.
7. See FOODDRINKEUROPE, FOODDRINKEUROPE’S CONTRIBUTION ON “COMPETITION POLICY
SUPPORTING THE GREEN DEAL” (2020), https://www.fooddrinkeurope.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/
FoodDrinkEurope_contribution_Green_deal_and_competition_policy.pdf (discussing the first mover
disadvantage).
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forced labor. 8 Unilateral and voluntary initiatives have proven deficient in
meaningfully addressing social and environmental harms. 9 Yet the corporate
purpose and antitrust debates are not acknowledging these practical realities.
Much to the dismay of shareholder primacy loyalists, the contemporary
business community increasingly regards stakeholder governance as a sine qua
non. 10 Notable players in the business and investment community, like the
Business Roundtable and World Economic Forum, have sworn allegiance to
“stakeholder capitalism,” 11 and acknowledged their responsibility to address
mounting societal challenges. Their advocacy has recently focused on the
pandemic, climate change, income inequality, and racial injustice. While many
in the corporate purpose and antitrust debates continue to dub these challenges
“social issues,” today’s investors are more inclined to view them as “systematic
risks” that impact the entire economy.12
Why are investors more focused on systematic risks today? Due to the rise
of index investing, capital has become increasingly concentrated in a few
large asset managers. 13 To put this in perspective, just three asset managers
collectively hold more than twenty percent of the S&P 500 and roughly eighty
percent of all indexed funds.14 These “universal owners” manage portfolios so
large, they have become “economy-mirroring.”15 Their business model relies on
indexing, which impedes their ability to exit a given company or industry.16 This
insulates universal owners from idiosyncratic risk, but leaves them susceptible
to systematic risk.17 Intriguingly, a handful of corporate governance scholars are
beginning to explore the implications of this phenomenon on corporate
managers and directors. Some argue that it justifies a different, “portfolio-wide”

8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Part III.
10. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Has Business Left Milton Friedman Behind?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/11/business/dealbook/milton-friedman-anniversary-sorkin-essay.html; see
also Lenore Palladino & Kristina Karlsson, Towards Accountable Capitalism: Remaking Corporate Law
Through Stakeholder Governance, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Feb. 11, 2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/11/towards-accountable-capitalism-remaking-corporate-law-throughstakeholder-governance/.
11. See infra Part I.B.
12. Systematic risk and systemic risk are often conflated. Systemic risk affects a wide range of economic,
political, social institutions, whereas systematic risk impacts financial markets and portfolios. See generally
JAMES P. HAWLEY & ANDREW T. WILLIAMS, THE RISE OF FIDUCIARY CAPITALISM: HOW INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS CAN MAKE CORPORATE AMERICA MORE DEMOCRATIC 21 (2000); see also John C. Coffee, The
Future of Disclosure: ESG, Common Ownership, and Systematic Risk 9 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. L.,
Working Paper No. 541, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3678197 [hereinafter
Coffee, The Future of Disclosure] (“institutional investors are more concerned with ‘systematic risk’ than are
individual investors.”).
13. See infra Part I.C.2.
14. See infra Part I.C.2.
15. See Madison Condon, Externalities and the Common Owner, 95 WASH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2020).
16. See id. at 33–34.
17. See id. at 35.
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fiduciary duty for directors and officers.18 Others point to new implications for
risk oversight and disclosure. 19 And legal scholars, again reflecting antitrust
law’s pervasive focus on protecting the competitive process, worry that
horizontally owned companies in the same industry will engage
in anti-competitive behavior.20 Still others question whether the concentrated
ownership is itself an antitrust violation.21 But the virtues of collaboration are
largely absent from this discussion.
Within antitrust law, a debate with familiar fault lines is underway. The
consumer welfare standard—a product of Robert Bork and the Chicago School22
—has for decades sought to promote more output at lower prices through the
competitive process.23 The “progressive,” or Neo-Brandeis, movement assails
the consumer welfare standard as overly narrow and seeks to return antitrust law
to its roots by reducing concentrations of corporate power. Neo-Brandeisians
argue that achieving this will not only increase competition, but also expand
liberty and bolster democracy. 24 The momentum behind the Neo-Brandeis
movement is palpable. On July 13, 2021, President Biden signed an “Executive
Order on Promoting Competition in the American Economy.”25 In it he warned
that “excessive market concentration threatens basic economic liberties,
democratic accountability, and the welfare of workers, farmers, small
businesses, startups, and consumers.”26 The Executive Order is animated by a

18. See John Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic Harms and Shareholder Value, 6 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 35, 54–70 (2014) (arguing for a different fiduciary duty for directors to maximize portfolio values, as
opposed to firm-specific shareholder value). But see Roberto Tallarita, The Limits of Portfolio Primacy,
76 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2023).
19. See Coffee, The Future of Disclosure, supra note 12, at 13.
20. See Condon, supra note 15, at 10–11; see also Mark Roe, Corporate Purpose and Corporate
Competition (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 601, 2021) (arguing that “corporate purpose
pressure” is easier to respond for companies in monopolistic markets because responding to the pressure takes
resources and detracts from shareholder profits).
21. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267, 1316–17 (2016)
(concluding that institutional investors’ horizontal holdings violate current antitrust law). But see Lynn LoPucki,
Repurposing the Corporation Through Stakeholder Markets, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2021)
(arguing that the antitrust argument “is not a serious threat” to horizontal shareholders who impose similar “CSR
obligations” on a large number of companies); see also Menesh Patel, Common Ownership, Institutional
Investors, and Antitrust, 82 ANTITRUST L.J. 279, 325 (2018) (arguing that an empirical analysis of common
ownership finding that “the extent to which common ownership creates competitive harm” is highly contextspecific and “depends on numerous factors”).
22. See infra Part II.B.
23. See Joshua D. Wright, Jonathan Klick, Jan M. Rybnicek & Elyse Dorsey, The Dubious Rise and
Inevitable Fall of Hipster Antitrust, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Oct. 15, 2018), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/
2018/10/15/the-dubious-rise-and-inevitable-fall-of-hipster-antitrust; see also John Newman, The OutputWelfare Fallacy: A Modern Antitrust Paradox, 107 IOWA L. REV. 563, 564 (2022) (challenging the conventional
wisdom that output is interchangeable with consumer welfare).
24. See infra Part II.C.
25. Exec. Order No. 14036, 86 Fed. Reg. 36,987, 36,987 (July 9, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/07/09/executive-order-on-promoting-competition-in-the-americaneconomy.
26. See id.
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“big-is-bad” rhetoric and focuses on low prices for consumers and more
bargaining power for workers.27
The traditionalists, for their part, continue to warn against deviating from
the consumer welfare standard. They argue that the Neo-Brandeis movement
will chill the competitive process by diverting antitrust law’s focus
from economic principles toward “social problems.”28 Despite their opposing
theories, the benefits of competitor collaboration are almost entirely absent from
both sides of this debate.
This is not surprising when one considers that antitrust law has always had
a fraught relationship with the idea of collaboration among competitors. A
leading law review article sums up this antipathy: “The Sherman Act has had
one principal success: cartels and their smoke-filled rooms, where competitors
agree to waste economic resources for their own industry’s benefit, are
unambiguously and uncontroversially illegal in the United States . . . .”29 This
sentiment is consistent with the economic theory underlying antitrust law.
While an emerging school of economics is studying the value of
“coopetition,” or cooperation among competitors, antitrust law remains
animated by a neoliberal economic theory treasuring competition.30 Antitrust
cases and enforcement decisions, therefore, tend to cabin prosocial collaboration
as “noneconomic” activity—and thus outside the realm of antitrust scrutiny
altogether—or as a sham to cover up collusion.31 Ironically, progressive antitrust
scholars also juxtapose prosocial and economic goals, arguing that “antitrust
law, with its singular purpose of bolstering market competition and consumer
choice, sometimes conflicts with private efforts to achieve ideological or social
objectives that require subverting market forces.”32
This Article introduces a new perspective on these debates and makes three
primary contributions. First, it connects the antitrust, corporate purpose, and
universal owner debates—a perspective that is absent from the literature.
Examining these debates side by side uncovers a shared tendency to draw false

27. While outside the scope of this Article, there is an important and growing interest in the impact that a
focus on consumer welfare has had on workers, who have increasingly unequal bargaining power. See, e.g.,
Sanjukta Paul, Antitrust as Allocator of Coordination Rights, 67 UCLA L. REV. 378 (2020); see also Hiba Hafiz,
Labor Antitrust's Paradox, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 381, 382–83 (2020) (describing “labor antitrust” as “uniquely
positioned” and superior to labor law in remedying wage suppression).
28. Joshua D. Wright, Elyse Dorsey, Jonathan Klick & Jan M. Rybnicek, Requiem for a Paradox: The
Dubious Rise and Inevitable Fall of Hipster Antitrust, 51 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 293, 294 (2019).
29. Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed Occupations Face Antitrust
Scrutiny?, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1095 (2014).
30. See generally Yadong Luo, A Coopetition Perspective of Global Competition, 42 J. WORLD BUS. 129
(2007); Philipp Goedeking, Competition, Cooperation, Co-Opetition, and Antitrust: Balancing Economies of
Scale and Competitive Market Structures, in NETWORKS IN AVIATION 105–11 (2010).
31. See infra Part III.A. I am using the term “prosocial collaboration” to refer to collaboration that
addresses environmental or social risks. While I concede that prosocial collaboration is not always financially
material or motivated by profit, I argue that increasingly prosocial collaboration between competitors is an
economic imperative today.
32. Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust and Wealth Inequality, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1171, 1213 (2016).
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distinctions between social or environmental goals and economic ones. Today,
however, an increasing number of social and environmental issues are
leading to systematic financial risks.33 While both corporate law and antitrust
traditionally point to regulation to address these risks, regulation is not able to
do so with sufficient speed or specificity. Rather, universal owners are
responding by self-managing the systematic risks impacting their portfolios.34
This alters directors’ and managers’ incentives by pressuring them to minimize
externalities that impact universal owners’ entire portfolios. 35 Such market
forces have elevated the role of collaboration in corporate strategy and decisionmaking. Companies are realizing that conserving scarce resources, committing
to bold climate initiatives, addressing human rights abuses, and fighting
systemic racism are economic imperatives that demand collaboration,
particularly among competitors.36
Second, this Article points out that antitrust law, as currently envisioned,
cannot accommodate this rising tide of prosocial collaboration. The U.S. debate
is not attuned to antitrust law’s chilling effect on prosocial collaboration.
Antitrust may even be growing more intransigent to collaboration among
competitors where large multinational companies are concerned. Antitrust
scholars and practitioners may counter that antitrust leaves “plenty of room” for
competitor collaboration, as reflected in the Competitor Collaboration
Guidelines, 37 jointly published by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC).38 By reviewing case studies of competitor
collaboration in practice, however, this Article reveals that antitrust law’s
narrow focus on consumer welfare impedes prosocial collaboration.39 A recent

33. Of course, not all social and environmental issues are financially material, but an increasing number
are. For an analysis of the subset of financial issues that are relevant to financial performance, see SASB,
https://www.sasb.org (last visited July 31, 2022).
34. See infra Part I.C.2. I would like to thank Barak Orbach for illuminating how the argument in this
Article diverges from traditional claims about “ruinous competition,” which describes losses that arise out of
excessive competition or excessive risk taking. A recent example of ruinous competition is the 2007 to 2008
financial crisis. What this Article argues is that today we face systemic risks that did not exist in the past. These
systemic risks demand collaboration among competitors. While collaboration should not be exempted from
antitrust scrutiny, we need to acknowledge that today’s market realities necessitate this collaboration, and to
develop a pragmatic approach towards allowing for them.
35. See infra Part I.C.2.
36. See infra Part I.C.2.
37. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG
COMPETITORS 1–2 (2000), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/joint-venturehearings-antitrust-guidelines-collaboration-among-competitors/ftcdojguidelines-2.pdf.
38. See Michael Bloom, Doing Good Well, FTC (Oct. 20, 2015, 3:38 PM), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/blogs/competition-matters/2015/10/doing-good-well
[https://web.archive.org/web/20210116091344/
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/competition-matters/2015/10/doing-good-well].
39. See infra Part IV.
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illustration of this is the antitrust scrutiny that “net zero” commitments are
receiving by state attorneys general in the United States.40
Unlike their American counterparts, European competition authorities are
not only cognizant of this potential conflict, but are actively debating whether
competition policy is thwarting the private sector’s ability to meet the goals of
the European Union’s Green Deal.41 The European Commission’s recent call for
contributions on this topic reflects this exigency: “We’ll be looking for ideas,
not just from competition experts, but from everyone with a stake in this
issue . . . . We need to work—and listen—fast.”42 Industry leaders throughout
Europe have recently responded that collaboration with competitors would
enable them to achieve the following: (1) create sufficient demand for
sustainable and ethically produced products; (2) achieve necessary scale to bring
sustainable products to market; (3) have meaningful impact; (4) ensure the longterm sustainability of common pool resources; and (5) comply with regulatory
requirements.43 U.S. companies are facing the same challenges, but under an
arguably more stringent antitrust regime for prosocial collaboration.44
Finally, this Article offers a policy proposal for aligning antitrust law with
the goals of the prosocial corporation.45 The policy proposal introduces a new
standard, the universal consumer standard, which would permit competitor
collaboration aimed at mitigating systematic risk. Unlike the current consumer
welfare standard, the universal consumer standard accounts for harms on future
consumers.46 This proposal comes at a crucial time. The Biden Administration
has not only rebuked shareholder primacy, but has also emphasized that climate
change, income inequality, and racial injustice are risks that must be addressed

40. Mark Brnovich, ESG May Be an Antitrust Violation, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 6, 2022, 4:40 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/esg-may-be-an-antitrust-violation-climate-activism-energy-prices-401kretirement-investment-political-agenda-coordinated-influence-11646594807.
41. See infra Part IV. See generally Competition Policy Contributing to the European Green Deal, EUR.
COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/competition-policy/green-gazette/conference-2021_en (last visited July 31,
2022); see also ALEXANDRA BADEA, MARIN BANKOV, GRAÇA DA COSTA, JOSÉ ELÍAS CABRERA, SENTA
MARENZ, KEVIN O’CONNOR, EKATERINA ROUSSEVA, JOHANNES THEISS, ANDREA USAI, SOFIA VASILEIOU,
ALEXANDER WINTERSTEIN & MARC ZEDLER, COMPETITION POLICY BRIEF: COMPETITION POLICY IN SUPPORT
OF EUROPE’S GREEN AMBITION (2021) (identifying perspectives following the 2020 engagement).
42. See EUR. COMM’N, supra note 41.
43. See infra Part IV.C.
44. See generally Anu Bradford, Adam S. Chilton, Katerina Linos & Alex Weaver, The Global
Dominance of European Competition Law over American Antitrust Law (July 2, 2019) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with Columbia Law School Faculty Scholarship Repository); see also, e.g., Niamh Dunne,
Public Interest and EU Competition Law, 65 ANTITRUST BULL. 256, 265–81 (2020) (discussing European court
cases finding that competition law does not apply to certain restrictive practices between competitors if they
serve a legitimate public purpose).
45. See infra Part V.B. This Article uses the term “prosocial corporation” to describe companies that are
embracing a more stakeholder-oriented view of corporate purpose and accounting for their environmental and
social impacts.
46. See infra Part V.
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to “build back better.” 47 The administration’s policy agenda for corporate
governance is cognizant of the role that companies must play to mitigate these
risks. On March 21, 2022, the Securities and Exchange Commission released its
proposal requiring that companies disclose information relating to climate
change in their annual financial disclosures.48 And it did not take long for the
Department of Labor to reverse its Trump-era admonition to trustees to disregard
environmental and social issues as “non-financial.”49 Though the rallying cry
against “Big Tech” is becoming a rare unifying force in an otherwise
polarized Congress,50 reforming antitrust law to enable companies to mitigate
environmental and social risks remains largely unexplored.
Collaboration among competitors raises weighty concerns that are both
practical and normative. Companies, especially multinationals, are hardly
sympathetic proponents of a prosocial agenda, and any leeway for collaboration
will have to be closely monitored. Also, antitrust should not be the only, or even
primary, tool for addressing systematic risk. Other vehicles like environmental
regulation, labor law, tax policy, and corporate law offer more promise. 51
Nonetheless, courts, enforcement agencies, lawmakers, practitioners, and
academics must acknowledge antitrust’s crucial role in mitigating economywide risks. Such a call to action may inspire a broader policy debate that
encompasses merger review, state aid, and other core tenets of competition
policy. This Article focuses more narrowly on how antitrust policy can begin
supporting collaboration between competitors with the collective goal of
addressing systematic risk.
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I demonstrates how the rise of the
prosocial corporation is linked to an increased focus on systematic risk,
encouraging companies to collaborate with their competitors. Part II traces the
theoretical roots of the antitrust movement to contextualize why the antitrust
debate has never focused on the virtues of prosocial collaboration among
47. See Lisa Woll & Aron Cramer, Joe Biden Can Be the President for a Sustainable Private Sector,
GREENBIZ (Feb. 15, 2021), https://www.greenbiz.com/article/joe-biden-can-be-president-sustainable-privatesector.
48. Press Release, SEC, SEC Proposes Rules to Enhance and Standardize Climate-Related Disclosures for
Investors (Mar. 21, 2022), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2022-46.
49. See The Biden Administration: A New Start for U.S. Corporate Governance?, INT’L CORP.
GOVERNANCE NETWORK (Dec. 2020), https://www.icgn.org/biden-administration-new-start-us-corporategovernance; see also Andy Puzder, Opinion, Biden’s Assault on ‘Shareholder Capitalism’, WALL ST. J. (Aug.
17, 2020, 6:59 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bidens-assault-on-shareholder-capitalism-11597705153.
50. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Jason Karaian, Michael J. de la Merced, Lauren Hirsch & Ephrat Livni, The
Case(s) Against Big Tech: Partisan Infighting May Take Pressure Off the Tech Giants., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/20/business/dealbook/big-tech-antitrust.html; see also Nandita Bose,
Biden Eyes Ex-Obama Staff to Tackle Big Tech and Other Antitrust Issues, REUTERS (Jan. 16, 2021, 8:52 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-biden-antitrust/biden-eyes-ex-obama-staff-to-tackle-big-tech-andother-antitrust-issues-idINKBN29L0PV.
51. See Sarah Light, The Law of the Corporation as Environmental Law, 71 STAN. L. REV. 137, 140–41,
149 (2019) (discussing how “[t]he law governing the corporation throughout its life cycle—corporate law,
securities regulation, antitrust law, and bankruptcy law—should be understood as a fundamental part of
environmental law.”).
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competitors. Part III explores antitrust statutes and case law, revealing an
underlying and increasingly frayed distinction between economic and
noneconomic motivations and outcomes. Part IV presents case studies that bring
to light how antitrust law thwarts the ability of companies to address systematic
economic risks. Finally, Part V introduces the universal consumer standard and
a policy proposal to harmonize antitrust law with the prosocial corporation.
I. THE RISE OF THE PROSOCIAL CORPORATION
The prosocial corporation’s recent ascendance is both disappointing and
befuddling to shareholder primacy loyalists.52 Many predicted that the COVID19 pandemic would at last call the bluff on socially minded investors and
executives. 53 To their surprise, the business and investment community has
doubled down on the prosocial corporation.54 This Part argues that many of these
blind spots arise from the fact that the corporate purpose debate is being waged
from the individual firm and investor perspective. While that point of view is
doctrinally consistent with corporate law and directors’ and investors’ fiduciary
duties (although this, too, is disputed), it is out of step with market realities.55
Shareholders today are so diversified that their portfolios are “economymirroring.”56 This diversification is leading investors to manage systematic risks
by putting pressure on their portfolio companies to reduce negative
externalities—a role which both corporate and antitrust law traditionally ascribe
to regulation.57
Many scholars on both sides of the antitrust and corporate purpose debates
do not fully appreciate that investor fidelity to prosocial activities is
economically rational. Notwithstanding this tendency in academic discussion,
52. See Lucian Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, Was the Business Roundtable Statement Mostly for Show? –
(2) Evidence from Corporate Governance Guidelines, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Aug. 18,
2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/08/18/was-the-business-roundtable-statement-mostly-for-show-2evidence-from-corporate-governance-guidelines.
53. See id.
54. See Georg Kell, Covid-19 Is Accelerating ESG Investing and Corporate Sustainability Practices,
FORBES (May 19, 2020, 11:10 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgkell/2020/05/19/covid-19-isaccelerating-esg-investing-and-corporate-sustainability-practices/?sh=2f05c19a26bb.
55. See Coffee, The Future of Disclosure, supra note 12, at 2 (“The era in which retail investors ‘owned’
companies or moved the trading markets ‘deader than disco.’”).
56. For an argument that ESG investing is prohibited by the sole interest rule, see Max M. Schanzenbach
& Robert Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing
by a Trustee, 72 STAN. L. REV. 381, 381–82, 406 (2020). For a critique of this view, see HAWLEY & WILLIAMS,
supra note 12, at 23 (arguing that the economy-mirroring portfolio of an institutional investor already bears the
costs of externalities, and that its “returns would be directly enhanced by a proper treatment of the externality in
the first place”). See generally Frederick Alexander, An Honorable Harvest: Universal Owners Must Take
Responsibility for Their Portfolios, 32 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 24, 28 (2020).
57. See Edward B. Rock, For Whom Is the Corporation Managed in 2020?: The Debate Over Corporate
Purpose 30 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. L., Working Paper No. 515/2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3589951
(arguing that regulation is the best way to reduce negative externalities); see also Michael C. Jensen, Value
Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function, 14 J. APP. CORP. FIN. 8, 16 (2001)
(advocating that regulating externalities “is the legitimate domain of the government in its rule-setting
function”).
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investors are acutely aware that accounting for environmental and social harms
mitigates systematic risks. As this Part reveals, this awareness is driving the
business and investment community to embrace the prosocial corporation more
than ever.
A. THE ACADEMIC DEBATE
In 2000, a well known article declared the end of history for corporate law
with a pronouncement that “[t]here is no longer any serious competitor to the
view that corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term
shareholder value.” 58 Fast-forward to the present, and corporate purpose has
reemerged as “the hot topic in corporate governance.”59 On one side, stakeholder
governance theorists blame shareholder primacy for exacerbating societal ills.60
These scholars argue that the corporation’s purpose is not to create profits at the
expense of society, but to solve society’s problems profitably. 61 In contrast,
shareholder primacy theorists have doubled down on their fidelity to profit
maximization as the only viable north star, arguing that it leads to societal benefit
through wealth generation and offers a proven way to hold directors accountable
to shareholders. 62 These traditionalists concede that businesses cause grave
externalities but point to regulation as the remedy. 63 Some claim, in a more
conciliatory tone, that stakeholder and shareholder interests converge in the long
term.64 Many stakeholder governance purists and shareholder primacy loyalists
disagree with this rosy view, correctly pointing out that stakeholder and
shareholder interests often diverge in practice.65 Because this debate assumes
58. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L. J. 439, 439
(2001).
59. Jill E. Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Should Corporations Have a Purpose?, 99 TEX. L.
REV. 1309, 1309 (2021).
60. See, e.g., Cynthia A. Williams & Peer Zumbansen, Conclusion: Evaluation, Policy Proposals and
Research Agenda, in THE EMBEDDED FIRM: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, LABOR, AND FINANCE CAPITALISM 477,
477 (Cynthia A. Williams & Peer Zumbansen eds., 2011) (arguing that shareholder primacy has increased
“inequality, systemic fragility and financial risk.”).
61. See generally COLIN MAYER, PROSPERITY: BETTER BUSINESS MAKES THE GREATER GOOD (2018)
(arguing that shareholder profits are a corporate output and not a corporate purpose).
62. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance,
106 CORNELL L. REV. 91, 100–01 (2020) (“[S]takeholderism would make corporate leaders less accountable and
more insulated from investor oversight . . . [which would] undermin[e] economic performance and thereby
damag[e] both shareholders and stakeholders.”).
63. See Rock, supra note 57 (“[W]e should not fool ourselves into thinking that tinkering with corporate
objective can begin to substitute for regulation to control climate change, assure decent wages and working
hours, and decent health care . . . .”); see also Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 58, at 442 (“the most
efficacious legal mechanisms for protecting the interests of nonshareholder constituencies . . . lie outside of
corporate law.”).
64. See generally R. EDWARD FREEMAN, KIRSTEN E. MARTIN & BIDHAN L. PARMAR, THE POWER OF AND:
RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS WITHOUT TRADE-OFFS (2020); see also Mozaffar Khan, George Serafeim & Aaron
Yoon, Corporate Sustainability: First Evidence on Materiality, 91 ACCT. REV. 1697 (2016).
65. See Ann Lipton, Not Everything Is About Investors: The Case for Mandatory Stakeholder Disclosure,
THE FINREG BLOG (Oct. 19, 2019), https://sites.law.duke.edu/thefinregblog/2019/10/10/not-everything-isabout-investors-the-case-for-mandatory-stakeholder-disclosure (“Investors are mainly interested in . . . a
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the perspective of the individual firm and investor, it tends to discount the
economic value of environmental and social initiatives, particularly when those
initiatives have a negligible impact on the individual company’s stock
performance. As Parts I.B and I.C explore, the investment community is
employing a different calculation and is viewing the prosocial corporation as a
proxy for sound risk oversight.
B. THE BUSINESS AND INVESTMENT COMMUNITY
In contrast to the stormy academic debate, the business and investment
community appears to be sailing swiftly towards a prosocial and stakeholderoriented view of corporate purpose.66 In 2018, BlackRock CEO Larry Fink made
headlines when he announced that BlackRock’s portfolio companies must
“serve a social purpose.” 67 In August 2019, the Business Roundtable—an
association of prominent CEOs—had swapped its commitment to shareholder
profit maximization with an embrace of “all stakeholders.”68 By late January
2020, the World Economic Forum at Davos unveiled “the Davos Manifesto” and
declared its allegiance to “stakeholder capitalism.”69 More recently, the Biden
Administration has promised to “put an end to the era of shareholder
capitalism.”70 Lawmakers are eagerly anticipating their chance to finally embed
a stakeholder-oriented view into corporate law. 71 From Wall Street to Main
Street to the Beltway, the prosocial corporation reigns triumphant.72

company’s financial condition or results of operations, but the general public also wants to know about matters
relevant to corporate social performance, including political spending, diversity efforts, and legal compliance,
even when these matters do not impact the corporate bottom line.”).
66. See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, BlackRock Chief Pushes a Big New Climate Goal for the Corporate
World, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/26/business/dealbook/larry-fink-letterblackrock-climate.html.
67. See Fink, supra note 3.
68. Press Release, Bus. Round Table, Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation (Aug. 19, 2019),
https://opportunity.businessroundtable.org/ourcommitment; David Gelles & David Yaffe-Bellany, Shareholder
Value Is No Longer Everything, Top C.E.O.s Say, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/08/19/business/business-roundtable-ceos-corporations.html. But see Peter S. Goodman, Stakeholder
Capitalism Gets a Report Card. It’s Not Good., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/09/22/business/business-roudtable-stakeholder-capitalism.html.
69. Klaus Schwab, Davos Manifesto 2020: The Universal Purpose of a Company in the Fourth Industrial
Revolution, WORLD ECON. F. (Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/12/davos-manifesto-2020the-universal-purpose-of-a-company-in-the-fourth-industrial-revolution/.
70. Andy Puzder, Opinion, Biden’s Assault on ‘Shareholder Capitalism’, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 17, 2020, 6:59
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bidens-assault-on-shareholder-capitalism-11597705153; Allison Schrager,
The “Stakeholder” Fallacy, CITY J. (July 16, 2020), https://www.city-journal.org/biden-stakeholder-fallacy.
71. Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018) (sponsored by Senator Elizabeth Warren).
72. More recently though, there has been an “ESG Backlash” from conservative lawmakers and CEOs that
has dampened some of this enthusiasm. See, e.g., Lisa Pham, ESG Backlash Has Fund Clients Demanding Proof
It Works, BLOOMBERG (May 31, 2022, 6:41 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-05-31/esgfund-clients-demand-proof-strategy-works-amid-backlash#xj4y7vzkg.
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This is not the first time that the business community has championed a
compassionate approach to capitalism.73 As far back as 1932, Professor Adolf
Berle, one of corporate law’s leading luminaries, described corporations as
“quasi-public” institutions that “serve not alone the owners or the control
[group] but all society.”74 But certainly by the 1980s, Milton Friedman—symbol
and scapegoat of shareholder primacy—had won the day.75 Friedman’s focus on
profit maximization fit squarely with the Reagan Administration’s libertarian
economic policies and Wall Street’s focus on short-term profit maximization.76
Although Friedman’s articulation of corporate purpose took center stage, it did
not deliver a fatal blow to the prosocial corporation.
Several initiatives emerged in the 1980s, largely in response to
corporate scandals.77 R. Edward Freeman’s 1984 book, Strategic Management:
A Stakeholder Approach, 78 represented a landmark in the development of
stakeholder theory. The rise of globalization and increasingly complex supply
chains prompted the Business and Human Rights Movement of the late 1990s,
which in turn led to the creation of the United Nations Guiding Principles for
Business and Human Rights79 and the U.N. Global Compact.80 These efforts
sought to address human rights abuses through a set of voluntary frameworks

73. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684–85 (Mich. 1919); see also Adolf A. Berle, Jr.,
Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1931) (arguing that managers should only
work for shareholders’ financial benefit); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?,
45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1148–50 (1932) (arguing that corporations had social and profit-making functions). For
a history of the evolution of the corporate social responsibility and sustainable investment movements, see
Dorothy S. Lund & Elizabeth Pollman, The Corporate Governance Machine (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. L.
Working Paper No. 564/2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3775846.
74. BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 356 (1932); see also, e.g.,
Roberta Ramano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 924 (1984) (“An essential
difference between Berle and contemporary corporate law reformers is that he had a normative theory of the
corporation and its place in the polity, whereas many advocates of reform are uninterested or unwilling to
articulate the vision of the good society that informs their policy package.”).
75. See Brian R. Cheffins, Stop Blaming Milton Friedman! (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. L., Working Paper
No. 523/2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3552950.
76. See Greed Is Good. Except When It’s Bad., N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK NEWSL. (Sept. 13, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/13/business/dealbook/milton-friedman-essay-anniversary.html
(“Milton
Friedman’s ‘The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits’ laid out arguably the most
consequential economic idea of the latter half of the 20th century . . . [and] was a call to arms for free market
capitalism that influenced a generation of executives and political leaders, most notably Ronald Reagan . . . .”);
see also Kimberly Amadeo, Greed Is Good or Is It? Quote and Meaning, THOUGHTCO. (Aug. 21, 2020),
https://www.thoughtco.com/greed-is-good-or-is-it-quote-and-meaning-3306247 (“President Ronald Reagan’s
policies matched the ‘greed is good’ mood of 1980s America.”).
77. See, e.g., Steven Toms, Financial Scandals: A Historical Overview, 49 ACCT. & BUS. RES. 477, 489–
91 (2019) (“Following [the] scandals of the late 1980s, there were moves to improve accounting standards and
corporate governance.”).
78. R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH (1984).
79. U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE HIGH COMM’R, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
1 (2011), https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/guidingprinciplesbusinesshr_en.pdf.
80. U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT, https://www.unglobalcompact.org (last visited July 31, 2022).
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and prompted companies to collaborate through trade associations and industry
initiatives.81 But until recently, these efforts have only had a marginal impact.82
C. WHY NOW? COMMON OWNERS AND EXTERNALITIES
1.

The Individual Company’s Perspective on Negative Externalities

This Article argues that the recent ascendance of the prosocial corporation
has coincided with two parallel developments, both of which reflect a
recalibration of negative externalities. First coined by the economist Arthur
Pigou, 83 an externality represents a cost (“negative externality”) or benefit
(“positive externality”) caused by the production of a product or service that is
not incurred or received by that producer or service provider. 84 Fossil fuels
provide a paradigmatic example of an industry that has externalized its negative
externalities.85 Simply put, the cost of gasoline does not reflect the “true cost”
of the environmental damage borne by society. Policymakers and academics
have long debated about how to minimize negative externalities to a socially
optimal level.86 Should we penalize bad behavior or reward good behavior? And
should these penalties or rewards be administered ex ante, through preventative
regulation or corrective taxes, such as a carbon tax, or ex post, through
regulations exacting penalties or tort law?87 Of course, private ordering plays a
role. Negative externalities often impact a company’s “social license to operate,”
which consumers, employees, and even investors can rescind in response to
egregious corporate conduct. Environmental catastrophes, such as Exxon

81. HIGH MEADOWS INST., THE ROLE OF INDUSTRY ASSOCIATIONS AND CIVIL PARTNERSHIPS IN
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 19 (2020), http://www.highmeadowsinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/
The-Role-of-Industry-Associations-and-Civil-Partnerships-in-Corporate-Responsibility_2020.pdf.
82. See Lund & Pollman, supra note 73, at 34.
83. ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1932).
84. See JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE & PUBLIC POLICY 122–52 (3d ed. 2011); see also Leo E.
Strine Jr., Fiduciary Blind Spot: The Failure of Institutional Investors to Prevent the Illegitimate Use of Working
Americans’ Savings for Corporate Political Spending, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 1007, 1033–34 (“‘[E]xternalities’
can be put in these more human terms: dirtier water and air, workers suffering death or harm at an unsafe
workplace . . . or consumers who are defrauded or injured.”).
85. Ben Machol & Sarah Rizk, Economic Value of U.S. Fossil Fuel Electricity Health Impacts, 52 ENV’T
INT’L 75, 80 (2013) (“Fossil fuel energy has several externalities not accounted for in the retail price . . . .”).
86. See generally Donald Wittman, Prior Regulation vs. Post Liability: The Choice Between Input and
Output Monitoring, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 193 (1977) (analyzing tradeoffs in regulating ex ante and punishing ex
post); Andrew Johnston, Kenneth Amaeshi, Emmanuel Adegbite & Onyeka K. Osuji, Corporate Social
Responsibility as Obligated Internalisation of Social Costs, 170 J. BUS. ETHICS 39 (2021); see also, e.g., Lynn
M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 54–88 (1996).
87. See Brian Galle, In Praise of Ex Ante Regulation, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1715, 1718 (2015) (questioning
the assumption that information is superior ex post); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Internalities, Externalities, and
Fuel Economy 3 (Harv. Envt’l Econ. Program, Discussion Paper No. 20-84, 2020), https://heep.hks.harvard.edu/
files/heep/files/dp_84_sunstein.pdf (discussing consumers’ failure to consider the impacts on their future
welfare).
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Valdez’s 1989 oil spill, and human rights crises, like Nike’s forced labor
practices, tarnish brands and inflict financial losses.88
Until recently, however, companies have mostly been incentivized to take
on more risk and externalize their negative impacts. Admittedly, environmental
activists and NGOs have enjoyed some rare victories. 89 However, the stock
prices of companies engulfed in crisis often recover remarkably quickly.90 In a
world of seemingly unlimited natural resources and cheap labor, the cost-benefit
analysis for corporate executives and directors was simple. Economically
rational actors became locked in a race to externalize their negative impacts.
Antitrust policy also encouraged companies to profiteer from
negative externalities by cementing consumer price as a normative goal.91 Yet
environmental economists have demonstrated that the low prices that antitrust
law applauds depend upon imposing negative externalities on the environment,
local communities, and future generations.92 In sum, “the most glaring misstep
in current antitrust thinking is ignoring externalities.”93
Today, however, there is an emerging consensus that we must swiftly
prepare for the negative social and financial impacts of climate change. This is
no longer a progressive argument. The Pentagon, for instance, has identified
climate change as a national security concern,94 and insurance companies are
building climate risk into their underwriting processes.95 Likewise in finance
literature, there is an emerging critique of the neoclassical growth paradigm,
which ignores physical limitations or “planetary boundaries.”96 An increasing

88. See generally Hillary A. Sale, The Corporate Purpose of Social License (June 13, 2019) (unpublished
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3403706.
89. See, e.g., Reuters Staff, U.S. Court Dismisses Energy Transfer Partners Lawsuit Against Greenpeace,
REUTERS (Feb. 14, 2019, 5:13 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-energy-transfer-lawsuit-greenpeace/u-scourt-dismisses-energy-transfer-partners-lawsuit-against-greenpeace-idUSKCN1Q403T.
90. Notable examples include Facebook, Chipotle, Samsung, Tyco, and Exxon. See, e.g., Anthony
Mirhaydari, Facebook Stock Recovers All $134B Lost After Cambridge Analytica Data Scandal, CBS NEWS
(Feb. 10, 2019, 7:56 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/facebook-stock-price-recovers-all-134-billion-lostin-after-cambridge-analytica-datascandal.
91. See supra Part I.A–B.
92. See, e.g., PAUL HAWKEN, AMORY LOVINS & HUNTER LOVINS, NATURAL CAPITALISM: CREATING THE
NEXT INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 64 (2d ed. 2000).
93. See Jeffrey L. Harrison, Other Markets, Other Costs: Modernizing Antitrust, 27 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 373, 385 (2016) (arguing that the goals of antitrust law—consumer surplus, allocative efficiency, and
productive efficiency—all fail to account for the true cost of externalities and resultant impacts on consumers).
94. See DEP’T OF DEFENSE, REPORT ON EFFECTS OF A CHANGING CLIMATE TO THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE 2 (2019), https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jan/29/2002084200/-1/-1/1/climate-change-report-2019
.pdf.
95. See Swenja Surminski, Climate Change and the Insurance Industry: Managing Risk in a Risky Time,
GEO. J. INT’L. AFFAIRS (June 9, 2020), https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2020/06/09/climate-change-and-theinsurance-industry-managing-risk-in-a-risky-time; Press Release, AXA, AXA Accelerates its Commitment to
Fight Climate Change (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.axa.com/en/press/press-releases/axa-accelerates-itscommitment-to-fight-climate-change (the CEO of AXA, a French insurance firm, comments that “[a] +4℃
world is not insurable.”).
96. See generally Gail Whiteman, Brian Walker & Paolo Perego, Planetary Boundaries: Ecological
Foundations for Corporate Sustainability, 50 J. MGMT. STUD. 307 (2013) (arguing that, to address climate
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number of businesses are recognizing that systemic risks, from climate change
to economic inequality, are threatening their long-term sustainability.97 Some of
this prosocial activity is a response to pressure from millennials and Generation
Z, who are increasingly using their leverage as consumers, employees, and
investors to address environmental and social harms. 98 Notwithstanding this
progress, individual companies may still lack adequate incentives to refrain from
externalizing their costs. With forced labor and natural resources in ample
supply, many businesses can continue to profit from exploiting people and the
planet. But the rise of concentrated ownership has changed that calculus.
2.

The Diversified Investor’s Perspective on Negative Externalities

Modern portfolio theory is “the analytical framework utilized by
investment managers.”99 It posits that investors must account for both risks and
returns, with the penultimate goal of maximizing risk-adjusted returns.100 By
design, diversification immunizes investors from idiosyncratic risks—by putting
their eggs in multiple baskets, investors protect themselves from a crisis at a
particular company or a downturn in a particular industry. Modern portfolio
theory is also the rationale underlying the rise in index investing. Through highly
diversified indexes, an increasingly smaller number of investors and asset
managers have opted to passively place their eggs in expanding baskets spanning
the entire market. Many chided John Bogle, the “father of index investing,” for
bringing this innovation to The Vanguard Group in 1976.101 Today, however,

change, which is a systematic risk to the economy, companies may need to collaborate to reduce output, placing
the values of antitrust at odds with the business community’s efforts to achieve long-term sustainability).
97. See Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, Corporate Law & Social Risk, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1406
(2020) (discussing governance reforms that companies have made to address ESG concerns, including tying
executive compensation to ESG metrics and changing the composition of the board); see also Konstantinos
Stylianou, Can Common Business Practices Ever Be Anticompetitive? Redefining Monopolization, 57 AM. BUS.
L.J. 169, 169, 172 (2020) (arguing that antitrust law is focused economic values of a bygone era, such as
efficiency gains, whereas businesses today are increasingly focused on long-term sustainability, and that
accordingly “antitrust law becomes detached from the very subjects it purports to regulate.”).
98. Michal Barzuza, Quinn Curtis & David H. Webber, Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund ESG Activism
and the New Millennial Corporate Governance, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 1243, 1295–99 (2020) (demonstrating that
millennials are more likely to incorporate social issues as investors, employees, and consumers).
99. SATYAJIT BOSE, GUO DONG & ANNE SIMPSON, THE FINANCIAL ECOSYSTEM: THE ROLE OF FINANCE IN
ACHIEVING SUSTAINABILITY 226–28 (2019) (discussing Harry Markowitz’s portfolio selection theory and
arguing that “Markowitz’s key insight was to show that the covariance between securities in the portfolio would
make it impossible to diversify away all the risk”). Modern portfolio theory has been criticized for relying solely
on the variance of portfolio return to measure risk. See id. at 230 (“Unfortunately, modern portfolio theory has
yet to be modified to incorporate a broader range of risk measures and metrics of co-movement.”).
100. See Mark Rubinstein, Markowitz’s “Portfolio Selection”: A Fifty-Year Retrospective, 57 J. FIN. 1041,
1042, 1044 (2002). See generally Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77, 77 (1952) (defining modern
portfolio theory). For a more contemporary treatment and critique, see generally JAMES P. HAWLEY & JON
LUKOMNIK, BEYOND MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY: INVESTING THAT MATTERS (1st ed. 2021).
101. John C. Bogle, Bogle Sounds a Warning on Index Funds, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 29, 2018, 10:15 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/bogle-sounds-a-warning-on-index-funds-1543504551.

1654

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 73:6

index funds have grown into a ten trillion dollar industry. 102 In light of this
meteoric rise, “[a]n identifiable shareholder with discrete and discernible
interests in a specific company is no longer the model that fits the majority of
American investors.”103 Today’s investors are more appropriately described as
“universal owners”104 who own shares in companies that are dispersed across
sectors, industries, or even the entire market.105
The wealth of universal owners is highly concentrated in a small number
of institutional investors. More specifically, “the Big Three” asset managers—
BlackRock, Inc., State Street Global Advisors, and Vanguard Group—
collectively hold shares comprising roughly 20% of the S&P 500106 and about
80% of all indexed funds.107 As a group, these “Titans of Wall Street”108 are the
largest shareholder in 40% of all U.S. listed companies and 90% of all
companies in the S&P 500.109 And their power has been steadily increasing: in
2009, BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street owned 7% of Apple Inc.’s shares,
but today they own 18%.110 In addition to large asset managers, assets managed
by employee pension funds, such as The California Public Employees’

102. See generally Neil Irwin, How to Win at the Stock Market by Being Lazy, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/04/upshot/stock-market-winning-strategy.html
(describing
the
“extraordinary payoffs of being a passive stock market investor”); Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, The Specter
of the Giant Three, 99 B.U. L. REV. 721, 723 (2019) (concluding that “the Big Three will likely continue to grow
into a ‘Giant Three,’ and that the Giant Three will likely come to dominate voting in public companies”).
103. Anne Tucker, The Citizen Shareholder: Modernizing the Agency Paradigm to Reflect How and Why a
Majority of Americans Invest in the Market, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1299, 1310 (2012).
104. See, e.g., HAWLEY & WILLIAMS, supra note 12, at 2; see also Tucker, supra note 103, at 1310, 1317.
105. See Condon, supra note 15, at 12–13. Universal owners and their incentives are analogous to the
incentives of communities that manage shared resources or “commons.” There is rich literature on collaborative
governance of these common resources. Most notably, of course, Elinor Ostrom, who was the first woman to
receive the Nobel Prize for Economics, showed that private solutions to common resource problems can be more
effective than regulatory interventions. See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE
EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); see also Brett M. Frischmann, Michael J.
Madison & Katherine J. Strandburg, Governing Knowledge Commons, in GOVERNING KNOWLEDGE COMMONS
1 (Brett M. Frischmann, Michael J. Madison & Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2014) (applying Ostrom’s analysis
of the commons beyond environmental public goods to intellectual and cultural ones). For an application of the
commons analysis to corporate law, see generally Simon Deakin, The Corporation as Commons: Rethinking
Property Rights, Governance and Sustainability in the Business Enterprise, 37 QUEENS L.J. 339 (2012).
106. See, e.g., Jan Fichtner, Eelke M. Heemskerk & Javier Garcia-Bernardo, Hidden Power of the Big
Three? Passive Index Funds, Re-Concentration of Corporate Ownership, and New Financial Risk, 19 BUS. &
POL. 298, 299, 313 (2017); see also Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Scott Hirst, The Agency Problems of
Institutional Investors, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 89, 100–01 (2017); Robert G. Eccles & Svetlana Klimenko, The
Investor Revolution, HARV. BUS. REV. (May–June 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/05/the-investor-revolution.
107. See Dawn Lim, Index Funds Are the New Kings of Wall Street, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 18, 2019, 5:30 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/index-funds-are-the-new-kings-of-wall-street-11568799004.
108. Jill E. Fisch, Assaf Hamdani & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The New Titans of Wall Street: A Theoretical
Framework for Passive Investors, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 19–20 (2019).
109. See Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 102, at 721 (predicting that this will eventually rise to 40% in 20
years). For example, six shareholders now control 24% of ExxonMobil and 26% of Chevron and have used such
power to pressure for “climate change” emissions restrictions. See Condon, supra note 15, at 10–11.
110. David McLaughlin & Annie Massa, The Hidden Dangers of the Great Index Fund Takeover,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 9, 2020, 10:40 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2020-01-09/the-hiddendangers-of-the-great-index-fund-takeover.
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Retirement System (CalPERS), have grown considerably.111 Unlike institutional
investors, where portfolio-wide voting strategy may raise “intra-beneficiary
conflict,” pension funds do not provide an option to select between asset classes,
meaning that all beneficiaries are equally diversified.112 To scale their impact
even more, universal owners have recently started forming large investor
alliances, such as Climate Action 100+, a group of public and private asset
managers that pledged to influence companies to reduce carbon emissions.113
Once the ambit of NGOs and policymakers, universal owners have
emerged as vociferous advocates for social and environmental initiatives. 114
Conservatives have dismissed these asset managers’ efforts as “socialist,” while
progressives claim they are merely veiled attempts to avoid regulation.115 But,
as explored elsewhere, there is a basic economic rationale unifying these
prosocial institutional investors.116 Universal owners are not only exposed to
systematic risk—the flipside of diversifying away from idiosyncratic risk—but
also must grapple with the reality that the business model underpinning index
investing also impedes exit.117 Systematic risk, also described as “unhedgeable
risk,” affects financial assets across any given portfolio or the entire market, as
opposed to picking “winners and losers.”118 Moreover, universal owners make
investments on behalf of beneficiaries with very long-term investment horizons
that can span generations.119
111. See Condon, supra note 15, at 13.
112. See id. at 57–58.
113. CLIMATE ACTION 100 +, https://www.climateaction100.org/ (last visited July 31, 2022).
114. See Gadinis & Miazad, supra note 97, at 1405–07; see also Coffee, The Future of Disclosure, supra
note 12, at 5–6.
115. See generally Mark R. Kramer, The Backlash to Larry Fink’s Letter Shows How Far Business Has to
Go on Social Responsibility, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 31, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/01/the-backlash-to-larryfinks-letter-shows-how-far-business-has-to-go-on-social-responsibility; Editorial Board, Larry Fink’s Latest
Sermon, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 17, 2020, 6:56 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/larry-finks-latest-sermon11579305418; Rupert Darwall, BlackRock’s Choice: Investment Fiduciary or Political Activist?, THE HILL (May
2, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/495673-blackrocks-choice-investmentfiduciary-or-political-activist.
116. See Gadinis & Miazad, supra note 97, at 1406–08.
117. See id.
118. See, e.g., HAWLEY & WILLIAMS, supra note 12, at 21 (explaining the difference between systemic risk,
which affects a wide range of economic, political, social institutions, and systematic risk, which impacts financial
markets); see also Markus Pelger, Understanding Systematic Risk: A High Frequency Approach, 75 J. FIN. 2179,
2198–2215 (2020). Climate change, for instance, has been viewed as a systematic risk. See, e.g., SCOTT KELLY,
JACLYN ZHIYI YEO, ANDREW COBURN, JENNIFER COPIC, DOUG CRAWFORD-BROWN, AIDEEN FOLEY, EUGENE
NEDUV, DANNY RALPH & FARZAD SAIDI, UNHEDGEABLE RISK: HOW CLIMATE CHANGE SENTIMENT IMPACTS
INVESTMENT 8 (2015), https://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/crs-unhedgeable-risk.pdf. Some
scholars have analyzed both the magnitude of climate change as a leading systematic risk and investors’ concerns
about it. See, e.g., Stefano Battison, Antoine Mandel, Irene Monasterolo, Franziska Schütze & Gabriele Visentin,
A Climate Stress-Test of the Financial System, 7 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 283, 288 (2017); Steven L.
Schwarcz, Systematic Regulation of Systemic Risk, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 1 (2019).
119. See, e.g., Strine, supra note 84, at 1012 (“Short-cuts get found out. And companies that externalize
costs to society and other companies do not benefit Worker Investors who pay for those externalities as investors
in a portfolio reflecting the entire market, and as human beings who breathe air, consume products, and pay
taxes.”).
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The term “passive investor” for universal owners is very much a
misnomer. Precisely because exiting a portfolio is challenging, universal
owners are flexing their power through a combination of private
engagement, shareholder proposals, and voting against individual directors.120
Universal owners are increasingly deploying these strategies to incentivize
companies to be more prosocial. Just consider the shareholder focus on
Environmental, Social, and Corporate Governance (ESG) issues during the 2021
proxy season, which range from worker health and safety to climate change.121
Given their systematic risk exposure and long-term horizons,
universal owners view prosocial activity as a proxy for sound risk oversight. The
more diversified shareholders are, the more prosocial they tend to be.122 Their
portfolios are “economy-mirroring”123—for a highly diversified pension fund,
“it is virtually inconceivable that something would be in the interest of
pensioners that is not in the interest of society.”124 Might universal owners be
right, then, about prosocial activity’s role in the risk landscape of index
investing? Arguably, universal owners are even more aligned with society than
lawmakers, who can depend on campaign contributions from special interest
groups, and even nonprofits, which depend on donations.
Boards and management are, in turn, responding to this pressure from
universal owners. As I have argued elsewhere, “boards are adopting reforms that
go to the heart of corporate governance[,]” including tying executive
compensation to environmental and social targets and transforming board
governance to prioritize ESG issues.125 Scholars are beginning to observe this
recent phenomenon, and are arguing that universal owners are also less tolerant
of companies that externalize costs than traditional investors. 126 While the
120. For a discussion of engagement on ESG issues, see Gadinis & Miazad, supra note 97, at 1407 (arguing
that engagement has become a defining feature of corporate governance in our era); see also Andreas G. F.
Hoepner, Ioannis Oikonomou, Zacharias Sautner, Laura T. Starks & Xiaoyan Zhou, ESG Shareholder
Engagement and Downside Risk 1 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. – Fin. Working Paper No. 671/2020),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2874252 (finding that engagement on ESG issues by directors, including diversity,
reduces downside risk); Amelia Miazad, Sex, Power, and Corporate Governance, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1913,
1943 (2021) (discussing shareholder engagement in the context of efforts to increase gender diversity).
121. GLASS LEWIS, 2020 PROXY SEASON REVIEW: SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS 1–2, 21 (Courteney Keatinge
et al. eds., 2020), https://www.glasslewis.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/2020-Proxy-Season-ReviewShareholder-Proposals.pdf; Marc Treviño, June M. Hu & Joshua L. Levin, 2021 Proxy Season Review:
Shareholder Proposals on Environmental Matters, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Aug. 11, 2021),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/08/11/2021-proxy-season-review-shareholder-proposals-onenvironmental-matters/.
122. See Lynn A. Stout, The Toxic Side Effects of Shareholder Primacy, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 2003, 2008,
2019 (2013).
123. See Condon, supra note 15, at 6 (arguing that “institutional investors’ climate activism is motivated by
their desire to mitigate climate change risks and damages to their economy-mirroring portfolios.”).
124. ROBERT A. G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 167 (5th ed. 2011).
125. See Gadinis & Miazad, supra note 97, at 1420 (discussing fossil fuel companies Shell, Total, and
Chevron adding emissions targets to executive compensation).
126. Robert G. Hansen & John R. Lott, Jr., Externalities and Corporate Objectives in a World with
Diversified Shareholder/Consumers, 31 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 43, 43 (1996) (“If shareholders own
diversified portfolios, and if companies impose externalities on one another, shareholders do not want value
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empirical research is scant, recent studies also confirm that firms with common
ownership invest in more prosocial or CSR initiatives. 127 Unlike traditional
investors, universal owners do not benefit from an individual company driving
up its share price if those gains come at the expense of other companies in their
portfolio. For the universal owner, then, the cost-benefit analysis of externalities
must be made not at the individual company level, but at the portfolio level. As
Professor Madison Condon recently concluded, “diversified investors should
rationally be motivated to internalize intra-portfolio negative externalities.”128
This increased sensitivity to externalities challenges conventional wisdom about
the high-risk tolerance that diversified shareholders typically have. Professors
John Amour and Jeffrey Gordon have also argued that, while diversified
investors typically want an individual firm to take on more risk
compared to a concentrated shareholder, this logic falls apart if that
firm is taking on systematic risks. 129 This Article argues that the diversified
investor’s relationship to systematic risk pressures companies to collaborate.
But, as Parts II and III explore, both sides of the antitrust debate have historically
discounted the economic value of competitor collaboration.
II. THE ANTITRUST LAW PENDULUM
Despite attempts to camouflage antitrust law as purely economic, it has
always been steeped in political ideologies.130 Even Robert Bork, who severed

maximization to be corporate policy. Instead, shareholders want companies to maximize portfolio values.”).
Hansen and Lott, Jr. also discuss structuring executive compensation to align it with the success of the entire
portfolio, as opposed to the executive’s own firm. See id. at 58.
127. See Xin Dai & Yue Qiu, Common Ownership and Social Responsibility 23 (Aug. 6, 2020) (unpublished
manuscript), www.ssrn.com/abstract=3668483 (presenting the first empirical study on the relationship between
common ownership and a firm’s CSR score).
128. Condon, supra note 15, at 1 (discussing why it is rational for diversified shareholders to deviate from
the objective of maximizing share price); see also Thomas A. Smith, The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A
Neotraditional Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty, 98 MICH. L. REV. 214, 242 (1999) (remarking that rational
investors “will agree on a simple rule: managers should make the choice that will maximize the value of rational
investors’ diversified portfolios”); Coffee, The Future of Disclosure, supra note 12, at 41–42 (“Because of the
high level of common ownership among diversified institutional investors, [they] can potentially profit on a
portfolio-wide basis by [imposing constraints] that seek to reduce externalities[]”—at least so long as such
actions benefit the “winners” in their portfolio more than they impose costs on the “losers.”).
129. See Armour & Gordon, supra note 18, at 39; see also Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should
Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value 3 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. L., Working Paper No.
521/2017),
https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/hart/files/108.00000022-hart-vol2no2-jlfa-0022_002.pdf
(explaining that because consumers and private companies account for externalities, public companies they
invest in should too). But see Tallarita, supra note 18, at 3 (providing an “empirical assessment of the limits of
portfolio primacy by examining the scope of action, economic incentives, and fiduciary conflicts of index fund
managers with respect to climate risk mitigation”).
130. See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky, Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1051 (1979) (“[T]he
political forces that produced the major antitrust statutes—in 1890, 1914, 1936, and 1950—varied widely[.]”);
Maurice E. Stucke & Ariel Ezrachi, The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of the U.S. Antitrust Movement, HARV. BUS.
REV. (Dec. 15, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/12/the-rise-fall-and-rebirth-of-the-u-s-antitrust-movement
(describing how U.S. antitrust policy and enforcement reflects shifts in economic, political, social, and/or moral
values).
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antitrust from its “socio-political” 131 origins and fastened it to economic
impacts, admits that “[antitrust] is . . . an expression of a social philosophy, an
educative force, and a political symbol of extraordinary potency.”132 Advocates
of the prevailing consumer welfare standard argue that we should celebrate that
antitrust law has matured beyond its erratic past and has focused on consumer
welfare as competition policy’s north star.133 But the recent rise of the NeoBrandeis movement and the attention it has garnered from policymakers
signals that the pendulum is swinging.134 To contextualize antitrust law’s current
juncture, this Part will briefly trace antitrust law’s history.135
A. THE BIRTH OF ANTITRUST LAW & THE BRANDEIS ERA
While the common law of antitrust goes back much farther, the
Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 is often described as marking the inception of
antitrust law.136 Enacted by a nearly unanimous Congress, it sought to forestall
the “great trusts.”137 The legislative history of the Sherman Act reveals its deeply
populist sentiments and prevalent view that “big is bad.”138 Economists were
always dubious of the Sherman Act.139 While some dismissed it as an impotent
challenge to stronger market forces, others worried that it would thwart the
economic efficiencies that only scale could offer.140 Both groups were relegated

131. Wright et al., supra note 28, at 304; see also Robert H. Bork & Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The Crisis in
Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363, 364 (1965); ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR
WITH ITSELF 7 (1978).
132. See Bork & Bowman, supra note 131.
133. Wright et al., supra note 28, at 293.
134. See, e.g., Barak Orbach, The Present New Antitrust Era, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1439, 1462 (2019).
135. For a history of antitrust law and policy, see generally William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust
Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 43 (2000); see also HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 47–74 (5th ed. 2016)
[hereinafter HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY]; WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN
AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT (1981).
136. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–38; see also Mark Grady, Toward a Positive Economic Theory of Antitrust, 30 ECON.
INQUIRY 225, 228 (1992) (explaining that “[a]s a body of common law, antitrust had an ancient history even by
1890, dating from at least the 15th century”).
137. In the 1800s, several trusts controlled entire sections of the economy, including the railroad, oil, steel,
and sugar industries. See, e.g., Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 135, at 45; Wright et al., supra note 28, at 298.
138. See, e.g., 21 CONG. REC. 2,457 (1890), https://appliedantitrust.com/02_early_foundations/
3_sherman_act/cong_rec/21_cong_rec_2455_2474.pdf (Senator Sherman: “[I]ndustrial liberty [lies] at the
foundation of the equality of all rights and privileges. . . . If we would not submit to an emperor we should not
submit to an autocrat of trade . . . .”); see also Sandeep Vaheesan, The Evolving Populisms of Antitrust, 93 NEB.
L. REV. 370, 406–09 (2014); Joshua D. Wright & Aurélien Portuese, Antitrust Populism: Towards a Taxonomy,
21 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 131, 140 (2020); Herbert Hovenkamp, Progressive Antitrust, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 71,
77 (2018) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Progressive Antitrust] (drawing a distinction between antitrust law’s
populist roots and the subsequent era of progressivism).
139. See Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 135, at 44 (“Most economists in the late 19th century scorned the
Sherman Act . . . .”); see also Patrice Bougette & Frédéric Marty, Information Exchange Among Firms: The
Coherence of Justice Brandeis’ Regulated Competition Approach 10 (GREDEG, Working Paper No. 2020–56,
2021), http://www.gredeg.cnrs.fr/working-papers/GREDEG-WP-2020-56.pdf.
140. See Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 135, at 44.
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to the periphery as lawmakers remained incensed with assailing concentrations
of power.
The Sherman Act’s broad prohibition of “[e]very contract,
combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce”141 gave courts
the power to define proscribed activity, and early Supreme Court
decisions reflect a mistrust of large entities.142 These seminal cases focused on
protecting “small dealers and worthy men,”143 even if upholding that ideal led
to higher costs for consumers.144 Two landmark Supreme Court decisions in
1911, Standard Oil Co. v. United States and United States v. American Tobacco
Co., compelled the breakup of major conglomerates and cemented this
normative orientation against big business.145
Standard Oil also marked the first expression of the “rule of reason,” a
multi-factor analysis under which the Sherman Act is deemed to prohibit only
“unreasonable restraint of trade.”146 While some behavior, such as price-fixing,
remained condemned by bright-line per se rules, the rule of reason analysis
allowed judges to assess anticompetitive conduct on a case-by-case basis. 147
Standard Oil’s introduction of the rule of reason caused trepidation among
members of Congress who felt it gave too much deference to courts.148
At this juncture, it is impossible to overstate the influence of Louis
Brandeis, the influential critic of concentrations of business. From his essays,
most notably, “The Curse of Bigness,” to his congressional testimony,
Brandeis argued that antitrust law should prevent corporations from
becoming too large.149 Unlike the contemporary Neo-Brandeis movement, 150
however, Brandeis did not necessarily view antitrust law as a vehicle for wealth

141. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
142. See William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the “Common Law”
Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661, 666 (1982); see also Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 135, at 44–
45.
143. United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 323 (1897).
144. See Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 135, at 44.
145. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 72–74 (1911); United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221
U.S. 106, 181, 184, 187 (1911).
146. Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. at 62, 64, 66–68; see also Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 135, at 45–47.
147. See, e.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397–98 (1927) (holding that a pricefixing agreement among competitors is an unreasonable restraint “without the necessity of minute inquiry
whether a particular price is reasonable or unreasonable”).
148. See, e.g., Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 135, at 46 (“Congress feared that the Supreme Court’s
apparent softening of the law, by reading the Sherman Act’s ban on ‘every’ trade restraint to bar only
‘unreasonable’ restraints, foreshadowed continuing efforts by conservative judges to narrow the statute
unduly.”).
149. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS
(Osmond K. Fraenkel ed., 1934); see also Naomi R. Lamoreaux, The Problem of Bigness: From Standard Oil
to Google, 33 J. ECON. PERSP. 94, 94 (2019).
150. See infra Part II.C.

1660

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 73:6

redistribution.151 Rather, he viewed antitrust as a way to restore personal liberty
and democratic ideals by combatting concentrations of power.152
Persuaded by Brandeis, President Woodrow Wilson asked Congress
to strengthen antitrust legislation, leading to two new laws in
1914: the Federal Trade Commission Act,153 which established the FTC, and
the Clayton Antitrust Act, 154 which expanded antitrust’s regulatory scope to
include mergers.155 Congress subsequently amended the Clayton Act by passing
the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, which added prohibitions on price
discrimination.156 From the Sherman Act to the Robinson-Patman Act, antitrust
regulation reflected a Brandeisian mistrust of large corporations.
Brandeis’ mistrust of big business is a timeworn American quandary.157 Yet
Brandeis eschewed this question altogether, unconvinced that larger firms
produced efficiencies in the first place. 158 For Brandeis, concentrated power
would necessarily lead to collusion, threaten economic liberty, and unravel the
very fabric of democracy.159
B. THE CHICAGO SCHOOL
Fueled by a mistrust of large corporations, the Brandeis Era persisted
through the late 1970s.160 When Milton Friedman was reorienting the normative
direction of business toward shareholder primacy in the 1970s, however, Robert
Bork was arguing that consumer welfare ought to be competition policy’s only
goal.161 The Brandeis Era’s captivation with concentrations of power was now

151. See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, How Much Brandeis Do the Neo-Brandeisians Want?, 64 ANTITRUST BULL.
531, 531–39 (2019) (clarifying that the Brandeis Era was not concerned with total social welfare in welfare
economic terms, but rather a social critique of power which corrodes democracy).
152. Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, 62nd Cong. 1167 (1912) (Statement
of Louis Brandeis); see, e.g., Bougette & Marty, supra note 139, at 18 n.35 (“[S]ize was not a crime, but to
Brandeis, it was a proof of criminality.” For Brandeis, “an industrial monopoly cannot be the result of a natural
growth without ‘ruthless practices.’”) (quoting GREGORY J. WERDEN, THE FOUNDATIONS OF ANTITRUST:
EVENTS, IDEAS, AND DOCTRINES 173 (2020)).
153. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58.
154. Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27.
155. See Lamoreaux, supra note 149, at 95.
156. Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13.
157. See generally Barak Orbach & Grace Campbell Rebling, The Antitrust Curse of Bigness, 85 S. CAL. L.
REV. 605 (2012).
158. BRANDEIS, supra note 149, at 120.
159. See, e.g., id.; Orbach & Rebling, supra note 157, at 608 (“Brandeis . . . believed absolute corporate size
was a public evil . . . .”); see also Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 718 (2017).
160. The Supreme Court repeatedly held that antitrust laws should protect “viable, small, locally owned
business,” even when “occasional higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented
industries and markets.” Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962); see, e.g., FTC v. Morton
Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 43 (1948) (“Congress considered it to be an evil that a large buyer could secure a
competitive advantage over a small buyer solely because of the large buyer’s quantity purchasing ability.”).
161. See BORK, supra note 131, at 97; Herbert Hovenkamp, Implementing Antitrust’s Welfare Goals,
81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2471, 2471–75 (2013) (explaining that Bork used the terms “consumer welfare” and “total
welfare” somewhat interchangeably); see also Wright et al., supra note 28, at 304 n.38 (“The choice of
‘consumer welfare’ or ‘total welfare’ has caused significant debate and terminological confusion in antitrust
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matched by the Chicago School’s focus on consumer welfare. To support his
argument, Bork scrutinized—or distorted, as some argue—the legislative history
of the Sherman Act, which he believed “overwhelmingly support[s] the
conclusion that the antitrust laws should be interpreted as designed for the sole
purpose of forwarding consumer welfare.”162 In 1978, Bork wrote that “[t]he
Sherman Act was clearly presented and debated as a consumer welfare
prescription.”163 In 1979, the Supreme Court incorporated those words into its
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp. 164 decision, elevating Bork’s argument to antitrust
gospel for decades to come.165
The linchpin of Bork’s argument was that courts should interpret antitrust
laws to advance the welfare of consumers and ignore other “noneconomic”
considerations, like monitoring firm size or protecting small businesses or less
efficient competitors.166 Many would argue that Bork transformed antitrust law
from an “interventionist, populist, Brandeisian, and vaguely Jeffersonian”
regime to “a mild constraint on a relatively small set of practices that pose a
threat to allocative efficiency.” 167 Economists lauded Bork for “[reducing]
antitrust law to an elegant and precise formula that ostensibly could be applied
with consistency, accountability, and scientific rigor.” 168 But the consumer
welfare standard had champions on the left, too. Most notably, Ralph Nader
supported the focus on lowering prices for consumers after decades of

over the years.”); Daniel A. Crane, The Tempting of Antitrust: Robert Bork and the Goals of Antitrust Policy,
79 ANTITRUST L.J. 835, 836 (2014) (pointing to a leading criticism of Bork: “[W]ith a disingenuous sleight of
hand, Bork shifted from consumer welfare to total welfare without changing labels, hence equating antitrust
policy with efficiency while continuing to package it in a consumer welfare pill that courts would easily
swallow . . . .”).
162. See BORK, supra note 131, at 71. For a critique of Bork’s interpretation of the legislative history, see
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust’s Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1, 22 (1989) (“Not a single statement in
the legislative history comes close to stating the conclusions that Bork drew.”). For a defense of Bork’s position,
see Crane, supra note 161, at 840–44 (citing BORK, supra note 131, at 41–47).
163. BORK, supra note 131, at 66.
164. 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979).
165. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 486 U.S. 85, 107 (1984); Arizona v. Maricopa
Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 367 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting); Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int’l, 626 F.3d
1327 (11th Cir. 2010). See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution,
31 J. CORP. L. 287 (2006) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise]; William E. Kovacic, The
Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double
Helix, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2007).
166. See Crane, supra note 161, at 847 (“The major thesis that Bork sought to advance was that courts
should interpret the antitrust laws to protect economic efficiency and to benefit consumers and not to advance
other objectives.”).
167. Id. at 835.
168. Id.; see also Douglas H. Ginsburg, Originalism and Economic Analysis: Two Case Studies of
Consistency and Coherence in Supreme Court Decision Making, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 217, 223 (2010)
(“The Court’s initial embrace of the economic approach to antitrust followed directly from the scholarly work
of Judge Robert Bork.”). But see HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 135, at 84 (“One of the
great myths about American antitrust policy is that courts began to adopt an ‘economic approach’ to antitrust
problems in the relatively recent past.”).
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inflation.169 With influential allies spanning the Reagan Administration to the
Naderian left, it is no wonder that the consumer welfare standard achieved
mainstream acceptance by the 1980s.170 The Supreme Court soon began to focus
on “demonstrable economic effects” and has since increasingly leaned on
economic theory to guide its decisions. 171 Bork’s reframing of the goal of
antitrust thus led to the adoption of the so-called consumer welfare standard.172
C. NEO-BRANDEIS ANTITRUST
While the consumer welfare standard is overwhelmingly favored by
antitrust enforcement agencies, practitioners, and courts, it is also besieged by a
rising antitrust movement which is “refram[ing] decades of antitrust law.”173
Under the banner of the Neo-Brandeis movement—sometimes dubbed “Hipster
Antitrust” by Chicago School devotees—this view supports somewhat of a
back-to-the-future agenda for antitrust law.174 The crux of the Neo-Brandeisian
argument is that the Chicago School’s focus on efficiency, prices, and consumer
welfare belies antitrust law’s original focus on market structure, while also
ignoring the harms that necessarily ensue from concentration of power.175 The
Neo-Brandeis movement is, at its core, a critique of power in the private sector.
Drawing inspiration from Brandeis, its proponents claim that “the structure of
our markets . . . can determine how much real liberty individuals experience in

169. See Khan, supra note 159, at 742 (“Ralph Nader and other consumer advocates also came to support
an antitrust regime centered on lower prices, according with the Chicago School’s view.”).
170. Id. at 735 (pointing to the 1984 DOJ-FTC Merger Guidelines as a “de facto approval of vertical deals”);
see also Stucke & Ezrachi, supra note 130.
171. See, e.g., John B. Kirkwood, The Essence of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers and Small Suppliers from
Anticompetitive Conduct, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2425, 2439 n.48 (2013) (“In Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), . . . the Court overruled its per se ban on nonprice vertical restraints and
declared that per se rules must be based on ‘demonstrable economic effect.’”).
172. Before turning to the Neo-Brandeis perspective, it is important to note the long-standing debate
between the Chicago School and the Harvard School. As Professor Alan Meese has illuminated, there are two
competing articulations of consumer welfare: first, Bork’s “total welfare,” which equates consumer welfare with
total welfare resulting from allocative efficiencies; and second, a “purchaser welfare” standard, which measures
the welfare of purchasers as measured by consumer surplus in a particular market. See generally e.g., Alan J.
Meese, Debunking the Purchases Welfare Account of Section 2 of the Sherman Act: How Harvard Gave Us the
Total Welfare Standard and Why We Should Keep It, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 659 (2010) (arguing that “consumer
welfare” should be changed to “total welfare” and “purchaser welfare”). Unlike the total welfare standard, the
purchaser welfare standard is a price-based standard.
173. The Neo-Brandeisians are focused primarily on “big tech” companies as targets for revamped
enforcement. See, e.g., David Streitfeld, Amazon’s Antitrust Antagonist Has a Breakthrough Idea, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/07/technology/monopoly-antitrust-lina-khan-amazon.html;
Jeff Horwitz, She Argued Facebook Is a Monopoly. To Her Surprise, People Listened., WALL ST. J. (Dec. 10,
2019, 3:44 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/yale-law-grads-hipster-antitrust-argument-against-facebookfindsmainstream-support-11575987274.
174. See Wright et al., supra note 28, at 294 (“The Hipster Antitrust label was introduced as a ‘lighthearted
way to capture a worldview of antitrust regulation expansive enough to solve societal woes ranging from
economic inequality to climate change, mixed with the kind of vintage 1960s-style “big-is-bad” thinking.’”).
175. See Lina Khan, The New Brandeis Movement: America’s Antimonopoly Debate, 9 J. EUR. COMPET. L.
& PRAC. 131, 131–32 (2018).
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their daily lives.”176 For the Neo-Brandeisians, the stakes could not be higher.
This debate amounts to protecting democracy , because they believe “autocratic
structures in the commercial sphere . . . threaten[] democracy in our civic
sphere.”177
To address this concentration of economic power, the Neo-Brandeisians
have turned most of their ire towards “tech giants” like Amazon, Google, and
Meta.178 Many antitrust practitioners agree that it is challenging to bring a claim
against these platforms, due in part to the nature of their products, which do not
result in rising consumer costs and, in some cases, are even offered for “free.”179
According to the Neo-Brandeisian view, however, we must look beyond prices
and recognize that concentration of economic power in a handful of companies
exacerbates other social ills, such as income inequality and labor abuses. Their
proposed remedy is to use antitrust policy as it was originally intended—a
redistributive tool to disperse economic power among many smaller firms.
The Neo-Brandeis fervor has caused proponents of the consumer welfare
standard—which remains the law—to sound the alarm bells and urge
policymakers to keep antitrust rooted in hard fought economic rigor.180 Many
opponents of the Neo-Brandeis movement fault it for seeking to redistribute
wealth away from consumers and towards less efficient competitors or labor.181
Some argue that the unpredictability of the Neo-Brandeis approach will chill
procompetitive conduct and encourage rent seeking because it makes “antitrust
enforcement more susceptible to political whims and influence.” 182 Others
disregard the movement entirely as “populist.”183
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. Rana Foroohar, Lina Khan: ‘This Isn’t Just About Antitrust. It’s About Values’, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 29,
2019), https://www.ft.com/content/7945c568-4fe7-11e9-9c76-bf4a0ce37d49.
179. However, even “free” products come at a price. See Horwitz, supra note 173. Moreover, the consumer
welfare standard does encompass quality and innovation as well, but demonstrating these factors isn’t as
straightforward as identifying price increases, making suits difficult, time consuming, and expensive to bring.
180. Glenn G. Lammi & Washington Legal Foundation, Transformation of Antitrust Law to All-Purpose
Cure for Socioeconomic Ills Would Backfire, FORBES (July 23, 2019, 10:21 AM), https://www.forbes.com
/sites/wlf/2019/07/23/transformation-of-antitrust-law-to-all-purpose-cure-for-socio-economic-ills-wouldbackfire/?sh=136e80b574a8 (“The Hipster Antitrust movement would replace 50 years of antitrust enforcement
based on rigorous analysis of price and other static economic factors with an amorphous, pliable public-interest
standard.”).
181. See Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Is Antitrust’s Consumer Welfare Principle Imperiled?, 45 J. CORP. L. 65,
81 (2019) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Antitrust’s Consumer Welfare Principle] (“Overall, the movement is not
enthusiastic about the use of economics in antitrust and appears to believe economics should either be
subordinated to political theory or abandoned entirely.”); see also Ramsi A. Woodcock, The Antitrust Case for
Consumer Primacy in Corporate Governance, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1395, 1398 (2020) (arguing for a duty to
minimize profits in corporate law to resolve the issue of corporate purpose in favor of consumers).
182. See Lammi & Washington Legal Foundation, supra note 180 (“[I]nstead of advancing the public
interest, Hipster Antitrust will facilitate anti-consumer rent seeking and political cronyism by a select few
entities, individual, and politicians.”).
183. See Hovenkamp, Antitrust’s Consumer Welfare Principle, supra note 181, at 89; ELYSE DORSEY,
GEOFFREY A. MANNE, JAN M. RYBNICEK, KRISTIAN STOUT & JOSHUA D. WRIGHT, CONSUMER WELFARE & THE
RULE OF LAW: THE CASE AGAINST THE NEW POPULIST ANTITRUST MOVEMENT 25–32 (2019),
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Despite these warnings, Neo-Brandeisian ideas loom large in a growing
number of policy circles.184 The movement’s future looks bright, particularly
because of its impeccable timing. Reminiscent of the arrival of Bork’s consumer
welfare standard at the epoch of pro-consumer sentiments, the “anti-big tech”
penchant is widespread across the political spectrum.185 Lawmakers are vying
to be at the forefront of antitrust reform, from Republican Senators Josh Hawley,
Ted Cruz, and Marsha Blackburn, to Democratic Senators Elizabeth Warren,
Amy Klobuchar, Cory Booker, and Mark Warner.186 Even President Joe Biden
has his eye on the technology industry. 187 As a result, there are numerous
proposals to impose a legal presumption against concentrations of power within
antitrust law.188 And the bias against large corporations expands far beyond the
Beltway, with state attorneys general across the political spectrum echoing
Capitol Hill’s growing voracity for antitrust as a tool to bridle big business.189
This is not entirely surprising because, as others have pointed out, antitrust has
often been leveraged in periods of concern about excessive corporate power.190
D. THE GAP IN THE CURRENT DEBATE
The Neo-Brandeis movement is decidedly anti-big business, at times
almost pining for the small businesses of a bygone era.191 The consumer welfare
standard similarly presumes “perfect markets” and rational actors who will
always pursue profit. Remarkably, both movements ignore the actual context in
which contemporary businesses operate. While Neo-Brandeisians advocate
prosocial goals, their tools are primarily redistributive rather than collaborative.
In other words, the Neo-Brandeisians are not advocating for large companies to
https://regproject.org/paper/consumer-welfare-the-rule-of-law-the-case-against-the-new-populist-antitrustmovement.
184. The influence of Neo-Brandeisian ideas on the antitrust policy and regulatory debate is reflected by the
fact that Lina Khan is the Chair of the FTC.
185. Thomas W. Hazlett, The New Trustbusters Are Coming for Big Tech, REASON (Sept. 5, 2019),
https://reason.com/2019/09/05/the-new-trustbusters-are-coming-for-big-tech (discussing how the political left
and right are joining forces under the banner of “hipster antitrust”).
186. See id.
187. See Bartz & Bose, supra note 5.
188. Elizabeth Warren, Here’s How We Can Break Up Big Tech, MEDIUM: TEAM WARREN BLOG (Mar. 8,
2019), https://medium.com/@teamwarren/heres-how-we-can-break-up-big-tech-9ad9e0da324c. Warren’s
proposal involves big, structural changes that include breaking up Amazon, Facebook, and Google. See Franklin
Foer Interview with Senator Elizabeth Warren, Elizabeth Warren’s Theory of Capitalism, THE ATLANTIC (Aug.
28,
2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/08/elizabeth-warrens-theory-of-capitalism
/568573/. But see Joshua New, The Hipster Antitrust Movement Could Undermine American AI, CTR. FOR DATA
INNOVATION (May 20, 2019), https://datainnovation.org/2019/05/the-hipster-antitrust-movement-couldundermine-american-ai (criticizing Elizabeth Warren’s antitrust proposal to break up big tech as chilling AI
development in the US).
189. See Claire Hansen, FTC, 48 Attorneys General Sue Facebook for Antitrust Violations, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Dec. 9, 2020), https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2020-12-09/ftc-48attorneys-general-sue-facebook-for-antitrust-violations.
190. See generally, e.g., HOFSTADTER, WHAT HAPPENED TO THE ANTITRUST MOVEMENT? (1964).
191. See generally E.F. SCHUMACHER, SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL: A STUDY OF ECONOMICS AS IF PEOPLE
MATTERED (1973).
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collaborate with industry peers to mitigate systemic risks, such as climate
change. Yet that is precisely the world that the corporate purpose debate is
pushing companies toward.
Neo-Brandeisians’ skepticism of collaboration between businesses should
come as no surprise. Recall that Brandeis’ view, which has been described as
“Jeffersonian,” favored the dispersion of economic and political power.192 That
normative orientation is precisely why Brandeis parted ways with Roosevelt’s
New Deal policies, which were “guided by a Hamiltonian logic that advocates
an equilibrium between big business and big government.”193 Brandeis was also
not a proponent of trade associations, which he likened to “competitionsuppressing cartels.” 194 Indeed, Brandeis remained staunchly critical of the
“associationalist model” of antitrust that was advocated for by President Herbert
Hoover and borne out of the collaboration between business and government
necessitated by World War I.195 Proponents of this view, including some leading
economists of the time, maintained that business leaders and governments
needed to collaborate through trade associations to exchange information and
address the inefficiencies that result from competition.196 But Brandeis firmly
rejected the notion that bigness can lead to socially desirable efficiencies. As
others have argued, “[f]rom his involvement in Wilson’s 1912 campaign team
to his dissent in the American Column ruling[197] . . . and his position against
the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) in Schechter Poultry in
1935 . . . Brandeis was consistent in his opposition to such a convergence
between big business and big government.”198
As this Article explores in Part III, the prevailing Bork school of thought
is not enthusiastic about collaboration between competitors either, but for
different reasons.

III. ANTITRUST FALSELY ASSUMES THAT COLLABORATION TO ACHIEVE
PROSOCIAL GOALS IS NOT PROCOMPETITIVE
As a leading antitrust treatise points out, “[i]t is obviously not the purpose
of the antitrust laws to condemn collaborations producing socially desirable

192. See Bougette & Marty, supra note 139, at 6–7.
193. See id. at 3.
194. See GERALD BERK, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS AND THE MAKING OF REGULATED COMPETITION, 1900–1932,
at 60 (2009).
195. See LAURA PHILLIPS SAWYER, AMERICAN FAIR TRADE: PROPRIETARY CAPITALISM, CORPORATISM,
AND THE ‘NEW COMPETITION,’ 1890–1940, at 194 (2018).
196. See Bougette & Marty, supra note 139, at 18–22.
197. Am. Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 412–19 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
198. See Bougette & Marty, supra note 139, at 1. Also, as William Bratton and Michael Wachter have
explained, Adolf Berle disagreed with Brandeis about the ability of antitrust enforcement to address market
failures. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy's Corporatist Origins: Adolf
Berle and the Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 110–11 (2008) (explaining that in contrast to Brandeis,
Berle thought that “market competition was part of the problem” and, as opposed to antitrust enforcement, it
was “better to accept the large economic units and mold them so as to make them useful to the people”)
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results.”199 But if collaborations begin to threaten consumer welfare, which has
become synonymous with price, output, or efficiency, then antitrust law
typically eschews evidence of prosocial intent or impact. 200 An illustrative
example is the DOJ’s investigation into four automakers that announced they
would meet California’s fuel efficiency standards.201 Assistant Attorney General
Makan Delrahim penned an opinion which began, “[t]he loftiest of purported
motivations do not excuse anti-competitive collusion among rivals. That’s longstanding antitrust law.”202
While Delrahim’s position has been scrutinized as partisan and not
grounded in antitrust doctrine, it still underscores antitrust’s false dichotomy
between economic and non-economic goals.203 The automakers’ collaboration
on fuel efficiency standards is not just noble; it reflects a recognition that their
industry is threatened by climate change. For universal owners, addressing
climate change is an economic necessity that ensures continued profitability. As
this Article explores in Part IV, companies routinely make voluntary prosocial
commitments to mitigate systematic financial risks like climate change.
While rare, antitrust law sometimes blesses collaboration, even if it
results in price or output impacts. Certain industries or activities, such as
farming and labor, enjoy statutory immunities. 204 There are also judicially
created immunities, such as the Noerr-Pennington205 and state action doctrines,
that are rooted in the First Amendment and “protect concerted efforts to restrain
or monopolize trade by petitioning government officials.”206 If the activity falls
outside of these exemptions, then antitrust law requires that collaboration be
either noneconomic or not harmful to competition. As this Part argues, antitrust
law’s approach to collaboration has always been plagued by a false assumption

199. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 1504, 1528 (4th ed. 2016).
200. See generally Inara Scott, Antitrust and Socially Responsible Collaboration: A Chilling Combination?,
53 AM. BUS. L.J. 97, 127 (2016) [hereinafter Scott, Antitrust and Socially Responsible Collaboration]
(discussing the chilling effect of antitrust on CSR activities).
201. Makan Delrahim, DOJ Antitrust Division: Popular Ends Should Not Justify Anti-Competitive
Collusion, USA TODAY (Sept. 12, 2019, 7:31 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2019/09/12/dojantitrust-division-popular-ends-dont-justify-collusion-editorials-debates/2306078001.
202. Id.
203. Press Release, Sheldon Whitehouse: U.S. Senator for R.I., Whitehouse Presses Antitrust Head for
Answers on Politicized Investigation of California Fuel Economy Agreement, https://www.whitehouse.
senate.gov/news/release/whitehouse-presses-antitrust-head-for-answers-on-politicized-investigation-ofcalifornia-fuel-economy-agreement; David Shepardson, U.S. Launches Antitrust Probe into California
Automaker Agreement, REUTERS (Sept. 6, 2019, 7:54 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-autosemissions/u-s-launches-antitrust-probe-into-california-automaker-agreement-idUSKCN1VR1WG.
204. See, e.g., Exemptions and Immunities Committee, AM. BAR ASS’N, COMM.,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/antitrust_law/committees/committee-eandi/ (last visited July 31, 2022).
205. ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH NO. 19, THE NOERR-PENNINGTON DOCTRINE (1993).
206. See David McGowan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Immunity: State Action and Federalism, Petitioning
and the First Amendment, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 293, 298 (1994).
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that competitors’ joint pursuit of prosocial goals is either completely
noneconomic or a sham to cover up collusion and price-fixing.207
A. LEGISLATIVE EXEMPTIONS
To the frustration of practitioners and policymakers, antitrust law
has exempted entire industries.208 The Capper-Volstead Act of 1922,209 which
allows competing farmers to pool their output and agree on prices,210 walks and
talks like a price-fixing cartel. So why did lawmakers exempt farmers? Some
argue that “the Capper-Volstead Act should be understood as part of a larger
populist movement to limit the power of big business.”211 The desire to justify
the exemption by characterizing activity as beyond antitrust law’s purview is so
ingrained in the Capper-Volstead Act’s history that some of its drafters even
viewed the farming cooperatives “more as ‘social’ than ‘economic
organizations.’” 212 Both proponents and critics of the Act assume trade-offs
between economic and noneconomic benefits. But it can also be understood as
an attempt by lawmakers to protect the farming industry: “The value of such
farm organizations to the producers of agricultural products is beyond
estimate. . . . It creates a civic force in large farming communities which protects
the farmers.”213
Scholars, policymakers, and antitrust practitioners roundly disfavor
industry-wide exemptions, and for good reasons.214 For one, they can become
“sticky” and difficult to repeal. They also facilitate the emergence of a small
group of “industry beneficiaries who benefit greatly from their special
privileges, while the consumers who suffer higher prices are harmed
individually only in small amounts and therefore are unlikely to exert much
effort to repeal existing laws, even if the laws’ macroeconomic harm is great.”215
207. See e.g., Louis B. Schwartz, “Justice” and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L.
REV. 1076, 1076 (1979); Lawrence Anthony Sullivan, Economics and More Humanistic Disciplines: What Are
the Sources of Wisdom for Antitrust?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1214, 1214 (1977) (evaluating whether noneconomic
goals would better inform antitrust policy). For a brief retrospective, see generally Harry First, Woodstock
Antitrust (N.Y.U. Ctr. for L. Econ. & Org., Working Paper No. 18-24, 2018),
https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Frist-Woodstock-Antitrust.pdf (dating the era
from 1969 to 1979).
208. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 204.
209. 7 U.S.C. §§ 291–92 (2012).
210. Id.
211. See Michaela Oldfield, Farmers’ Cooperatives to Regionalize Food Systems: A Critique of Local Food
Law Scholarship and Suggestion for Critical Reconsideration of Existing Legal Tools for Changing the U.S.
Food System, 47 ENVTL. L. 225, 239 (2017).
212. For a discussion of the legislative history, see generally James L. Guth, Farmer Monopolies,
Cooperatives, and the Intent of Congress: Origins of the Capper-Volstead Act, 56 AGRIC. HIST. 67 (1982).
213. 61st Cong. Rec. 1043 (1921) (statement by Rep. Ira Hersey).
214. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. ANTITRUST DIV., ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION SERIES ON
COMPETITION & DEREGULATION (2018), https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1120641/download; John
Roberti, Kelse Moen & Jana Steeholdt, The Role and Relevance of Exemptions and Immunities in U.S. Antitrust
Law, DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1042806/download.
215. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 214, at 37.
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To be clear, this Article does not call for blanket industry exemptions.216 Rather,
it seeks to illustrate Congress’s willingness to restrain trade in the interest of
sustaining the long-term sustainability of an economic activity that society
depends on. A similar motivation can fuel a restraint on trade to advance efforts
to mitigate climate change, as this Article explores in Part V.
B. EXEMPTIONS FOR NONECONOMIC OR POLITICAL ACTIVITY
The Sherman Act applies to “trade” or “commerce,” and courts have long
interpreted it to exempt noncommercial activities that promote “social
causes.”217 Senator Sherman himself allayed lawmakers’ fears that the Sherman
Act would creep into so-called noneconomic territory like religion or alcohol. In
addition to a general exemption for noncommercial activity, under the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine,218 entities that petition the government may receive
full immunity under the First Amendment,219 regardless of any anticompetitive
intent or effect.220 This exemption often arises with group boycotts, which are
protected if the boycott was motivated by political aims.221 In State of Missouri
v. National Organization for Women, for instance, the Eighth Circuit held that
the National Organization of Women (NOW) did not violate the Sherman Act
by refusing to hold conventions in states that had not ratified the Equal Rights
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 222 The court reasoned that NOW was
attempting to advance a social or political, rather than economic, cause. 223
Similarly, in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., the Supreme Court allowed
the NAACP to boycott white-owned businesses for their refusal to accept racial
integration because its purpose “was not to destroy legitimate competition,” but
216. See infra Part V.
217. See, e.g., Sally F. Rogers, Sherman Act Liability for a Religiously Motivated Boycott, 17 VAL. U. L.
REV. 515, 521 (1983) (reviewing the legislative history of the Sherman Act and arguing that “[o]ne can glean an
affirmative intent to regulate business competitors, not organizations motivated by social, moral, religious or
political concerns.”); United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 665 (3d Cir. 1993) (“It is axiomatic that section
one of the Sherman Act regulates only transactions that are commercial in nature.”); see also John M. Newman,
Procompetitive Justifications in Antitrust Law, 94 IND. L.J 501, 526 (2019) (arguing that antitrust courses should
exempt non-commercial activity at the outset of the inquiry and before moving on to “the zero-stage of analysis”
where courts decide between the rule of reason and the per se rule).
218. See E.R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 138 (1961) (Noerr) (holding
that the First Amendment protects entities who petition the government, even if that conduct is anticompetitive).
219. The First Amendment states: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
220. See Hillary Greene, Muzzling Antitrust: Information Products, Innovation and Free Speech, 95 B.U.
L. REV. 35, 53 (2015) [hereinafter Greene, Muzzling Antitrust] (“Political speech, in the form of petitioning the
government, constitutes the one context in which even unlawful anticompetitive conduct receives First
Amendment-based immunization from the antitrust laws.”).
221. See Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136. For a brief history of political boycotts in the United States, see Theresa J.
Lee, Democratizing the Economic Sphere: A Case for the Political Boycott, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 531, 548 (2012).
222. See, e.g., Charles P. Cockerill, Application of Noerr-Pennington and the First Amendment to Politically
Motivated Economic Boycotts: Missouri v. NOW, 13 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 85, 86 (1979); Greene, Muzzling
Antitrust, supra note 220, at 55. See generally Missouri v. Nat’l Org. for Women, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1980).
223. See Cockerill, supra note 222, at 107; see also Greene, Muzzling Antitrust, supra note 220, at 55. See
generally Nat’l Org. for Women, 620 F.2d at 1301.
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rather, “to vindicate rights of equality and of freedom that lie at the heart of the
Fourteenth Amendment itself.” 224 Thus, while group boycotts restrain trade,
“the Court has recognized immunity from the Sherman Act when the actor is not
a businessman and the purpose is not commercial, irrespective of an
anticompetitive effect.”225
In group boycott cases, applying the Noerr-Pennington exemption often
hinges on distinguishing whether the purpose is commercial or
noncommercial.226 But this distinction is tenuous. Courts faced with a group
boycott sometimes focus on the actor’s nonprofit status to guide them, but
antitrust law does not normally draw a distinction between nonprofit and forprofit organizations.227 To the contrary, courts have recognized that nonprofit
colleges or hospitals can and do collude.228 Group boycotts are also invariably
motivated by a mix of economic and political aims.229 In these common mixedmotive boycotts, courts ask whether the boycott’s purpose is primarily economic
or political.230 Under this test, an economic boycott seeks to improve market
power, whereas a political boycott “uses concerted economic pressure to
achieve social or political, rather than economic, ends.”231 Courts have held that
competitors violate antitrust law if their “primary purpose” of joining a boycott
is for economic reasons as opposed to political ones.232
224. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 888, 914 (1982) (referring to the “chameleonlike” quality of legal doctrine surrounding conspiracies and concerted action and described the actions of the
civil rights boycotts as having “elements of criminality and elements of majesty”).
225. See Rogers, supra note 217, at 526 (discussing Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975)); see
also United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 148 (1966) (invoking a boycott per se rule where retailers
induced manufacturers not to sell to competing retailers).
226. See Editors, Protest Boycotts Under the Sherman Act, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1131, 1156 (1980) (arguing
against antitrust immunity for political boycotts). See generally Hillary Greene, Antitrust Censorship of
Economic Protest, 59 DUKE L.J. 1037 (2010) [hereinafter Greene, Antitrust Censorship]; Kay P. Kindred, When
First Amendment Values and Competition Policy Collide: Resolving the Dilemma of Mixed Motive Boycotts,
34 ARIZ. L. REV. 709 (1992).
227. See, e.g., Tomas J. Philipson & Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the Non-Profit Sector (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 12132, 2006), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers
/w12132/w12132.pdf (“[A]ltruistic firms benefit from exploiting market power, just as non-altruistic ones do,
even when they would price below cost without regard to competition.”); see also Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. FTC,
807 F.2d 1381, 1390 (7th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he adoption of the nonprofit form does not change human
nature . . . .”); Peter James Kolovos, Antitrust Law and Nonprofit Organizations: The Law School Accreditation
Case, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 689, 729 (1996) (arguing for the application of a rule of reason test to nonprofit
collaboration). But see Tara Norgard, How Charitable Is the Sherman Act?, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1515, 1553
(1999).
228. See Philipson & Posner, supra note 227.
229. See, e.g, Ronald E. Kennedy, Political Boycotts, the Sherman Act, and the First Amendment: An
Accommodation of Competing Interests, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 983, 990 (1982) (using the term “mixed-motive
boycotts” to refer to boycotts motivated by both political and economic concerns); see also Maurice E. Stucke,
Is Intent Relevant?, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 801, 843 (2012) (discussing that the intent of competitors is often
both collaboration and competition). See generally Kindred, supra note 226, at 711 (discussing mixed-motives
boycotts).
230. See Stucke, supra note 229, at 843.
231. See id.
232. See, e.g., Greene, Antitrust Censorship, supra note 226, at 54 (“[T]he Court’s polar approach cannot
accommodate more complex realities in which the boycotters’ mixed motives include economic self-interests as
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Assumptions about the purpose of business as a primarily profit-making
endeavor necessarily cloud this analysis. In FTC v. Superior Court Trial
Lawyers Ass’n,233 a group of trial lawyers from the District of Columbia agreed
to stop representing indigent criminal defendants until legislation was passed to
increase the lawyers’ compensation. The lawyers argued that they were seeking
to improve the quality of representation for indigent defendants.234 The Supreme
Court, however, noted the FTC’s finding that the previous compensation scheme
provided an adequate supply of defense lawyers and found that the additional
millions in fees that would result were “substantial anticompetitive effects
resulting from the [trial lawyers’] conduct.”235
Scholars have lamented that it is unworkable for courts to divine when an
activity is motivated by a political or social, as opposed to economic, intent.236
Others argue that this foundational inquiry into motives is necessary because
“[a]ntitrust doctrinally recognizes the need for balance by immunizing truly nonwelfare motivated, or ‘noncommercial,’ conduct” at the outset.”237 But what is
“welfare motivated” hinges on intent—a notoriously elusive concept.238 Today,
however, the line between “economic” and “noneconomic” activity is not as
stark—brand activism, or engaging on social and political issues, is a business
imperative.239
C. PROCOMPETITIVE JUSTIFICATIONS
Once activity is labeled as “commercial,” it raises the specter of antitrust
scrutiny and courts must decide whether it imposes an “unreasonable restraint
on trade.”240 There are two rules that courts use: the per se rule and the more
well as noneconomic or political interests.”); Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Intent, 74 S. CAL. L.
REV. 657, 659 (2001); Andrew Verstein, The Jurisprudence of Mixed Motives, 127 YALE L.J. 1106, 1174 (2018)
(citing FTC v. Superior Court Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990)); see also E.R.R. Presidents Conf. v.
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 139, 144 (1961) (acknowledging the presence of both political and
economic motivations and rejecting the motivating factor test); see also Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian
Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 508 (1988) (using a primary purpose test, arguably); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware
Co., 458 U.S. 886, 914 (1982) (using a primary purpose test).
233. See Superior Court Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 411.
234. See id. at 419.
235. See id. at 420.
236. See, e.g., Paul G. Mahoney, A Market Power Test for Noncommercial Boycotts, 93 YALE L.J. 523, 540
(1984) (arguing that “attempts to distinguish between commercially motivated and politically motivated boycotts
allow potentially anticompetitive results” and advocating for an economic effects test, rather than a political
motive test).
237. See Newman, supra note 217, at 530.
238. See Cass & Hylton, supra note 232, at 657–58 (2001); Spencer Weber Waller, The Language of Law
and the Language of Business, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 283, 334 (2001).
239. See Tom C. W. Lin, Incorporating Social Activism, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1535, 1546 (2018) (“Many in
society and within corporations now expect businesses and executives particularly those at large public
companies, to engage with the critical social issues of today. Silence and indifference are becoming less and less
the norm.”); see also Yashoda Bhagwat, Nooshin L. Warren, Joshua T. Beck & George F. Watson IV, Corporate
Sociopolitical Activism and Firm Value, 84 J. MKTG 1, 1 (2020).
240. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 199, at 262 (discussion of cases exempting noncommercial
activity as immune from antitrust liability).
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searching rule of reason analysis.241 In theory, activities such as price-fixing,
group boycotts, and output restraints receive per se treatment.242 In practice,
however, most contemporary business activities survive this test.243 With the
rise of economic analyses inspired by Bork in the late 1970s—and first
articulated by Justice Brandeis in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States—
antitrust courts began abandoning per se rules in favor of the rule of reason
standard.244
The rule of reason test is a fact-intensive conduct standard that prohibits
an activity if its competitive harms outweigh the consumer benefits.245 While
Justice Brandeis conceived of the rule of reason standard before an economic
theory of “market failure,” he was prescient in recognizing that restraints on
trade are sometimes necessary to prevent such failures.246 Courts applying the
rule of reason test consider three factors: first, whether the plaintiff has shown a
significant anticompetitive effect from the challenged practice (e.g., price
increase, output reduction, or market power); second, whether the defendant has
offered procompetitive reasons to justify these negative effects; and third,
whether the plaintiff has rebutted these procompetitive justifications by showing
that the restraint is not reasonably necessary to attain defendant’s objectives (or
that less restrictive measures could attain these objectives). Finally, the court
balances the anticompetitive effects and procompetitive justifications to reach a
conclusion.247
In general, courts applying the rule of reason test “have rejected calls for
consideration of the social value or purpose of a collective agreement.”248 Time
and again, the Supreme Court has insisted that “good intentions” do not
matter.249 In FTC v. Wallace, for example, the Court explained that “it is not the
prerogative of private parties to act as self-constituted censors of business ethics,
to install themselves as judges and guardians of the public welfare, and to
enforce by drastic measures their conceptions thus informed.”250 And in NCAA

241. See Andrew I. Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and Characterization: The Modern Rule of Reason
in Practice, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 746 (2012).
242. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940) (“Whatever economic
justification particular price-fixing agreements may be thought to have, the law does not permit an inquiry into
their reasonableness.”).
243. See Michael A. Carrier, The Four Step Rule of Reason, 33 ANTITRUST 50, 50 (2019).
244. 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
245. See Carrier, supra note 243.
246. See Newman, supra note 217, at 518 (“Brandeis’ articulation highlights a useful point: left unrestrained
in a literal sense, markets may fail to produce optimal results, i.e., cause ‘evil.’ What looks like a harmful restraint
of trade may, in fact, be a ‘remedy’ for undesirable results.”).
247. See Carrier, supra note 243.
248. See Scott, Antitrust and Socially Responsible Collaboration, supra note 200, at 122.
249. See, e.g., Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 684–85, 694–95 (1978) (rejecting
public safety as a procompetitive justification for a ban on price competition); FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists,
476 U.S. 447, 462–64 (1986) (rejecting public health and access to dental care as a procompetitive justification
for refusal to provide x-rays to insurers as a way of preventing them from denying coverage for dental treatment).
250. 75 F.2d 733, 737 (8th Cir. 1935).

1672

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 73:6

v. Board of Regents, the Court applied a rule of reason analysis to the NCAA’s
mandatory price and broadcast agreement, rejecting the procompetitive
justification that the agreement benefited society by maintaining the “revered
tradition of amateurism in college sports.”251
The attempt to draw a line between prosocial and procompetitive activity
was particularly tenuous in United States v. Brown University.252 In that case,
nine competing colleges sought to award only need-based financial aid to
students. The Third Circuit found that promoting a “social ideal of equality of
educational access and opportunity,” a noneconomic justification, was actually
procompetitive.253 Upon remand, however, the district court was instructed “to
more fully investigate the procompetitive and noneconomic justifications
proffered.”254
Brown suggests that competitors may be able to collaborate under a rule of
reason analysis in areas where Congress has a demonstrated commitment to
prosocial goals. But a binary distinction between economic and noneconomic
motives is impractical. Need-based financial aid, for example, is motivated by
concerns not only for social welfare and equality of opportunity, but also
economic mobility.255
D. THE CURRENT MARKET FAILURE TEST IS INCONSISTENT WITH UNIVERSAL
OWNERSHIP
While courts routinely dismiss noneconomic, or “non-welfare,”
justifications, precisely what procompetitive reasons come into play is, as
Justice Breyer famously stated, “an absolute mystery.” 256 As Professor John
Newman points out, the “relevant case law reveals multiple competing
approaches and seemingly irreconcilable opinions” on what constitutes
“beneficial.”257 After all, whether a particular activity is beneficial necessarily
begs the question: beneficial to what end? Professor Newman traces this
confusion to the use of three different tests by courts.
Under the “market failure” approach, a valid justification is present if—
and only if—the challenged restraint alleviates a market failure. Alternatively,
the “competitive process” approach attempts to condemn restraints that harm
(and bless restraints that benefit) “competition” itself or the so-called
“competitive process.” Lastly, the “type of effect” approach appears to offer a

251. 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984).
252. 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993).
253. See Nathan Boninger, Antitrust and the NCAA: Sexual Equality in Collegiate Athletics as a
Procompetitive Justification for NCAA Compensation Restrictions, 65 UCLA L. REV. 754, 757–58 (2018).
254. See Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 661, 678.
255. See Newman, supra note 217, at 530 (citing 154 Cong. Rec. 22, 817 (2008)) (“This exemption
originated because Congress disagreed with a suit brought by the Department of Justice against nine colleges
for their efforts to use common criteria to assess each student’s financial need.”).
256. Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018) (No. 16-1454).
257. See Newman, supra note 217, at 502.
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shortcut: simply identify the effects of the challenged restraint, then ascertain
whether they align with a pre-approved typology of virtuous marketplace effects
(e.g., higher output, lower prices, etc.).258
This Article agrees with Professor Newman’s doctrinal, normative, and
practical arguments in favor of the market failure test.259 Most contemporary
courts also hold that “alleviating a market failure is an acceptable procompetitive
justification.”260 But the market failure test is fundamentally at odds with the
market reality of increasing universal ownership. In Part V, this Article proposes
a new standard, the universal consumer standard, which attempts to harmonize
antitrust with universal ownership and empowers it to address systematic risks.
Before doing so, it is important to appreciate how the current consumer welfare
standard impedes collaboration to address systematic risks, which the next Part
explores.
IV. HOW ANTITRUST IMPEDES COMPETITORS FROM COLLABORATING TO
MITIGATE SYSTEMATIC RISK
In 2015, Michael Bloom, Assistant Director of Policy and Coordination at
the FTC, addressed “how companies can work together to achieve social welfare
goals—such as environmental objectives, health and safety objectives, or labor
objectives—without running afoul of the antitrust laws.” 261 He began with a
familiar admonition that even “laudable social welfare objectives” violate
antitrust law if they restrict output, increase prices, or otherwise harm
competition under the more searching rule of reason analysis.262 But he also
insisted that antitrust leaves “plenty of room for well-structured joint efforts to
advance social welfare goals.”263 This Part examines case studies of competitor
collaboration to argue that, in practice, antitrust law actually prevents companies
from addressing systematic risks.
To contextualize how voluntary collaboration among competitors has
evolved, this Part begins with a brief overview of global civil regulation and its
limitations. It then describes how competition authorities and courts have
addressed prosocial collaboration. It reveals that antitrust enforcement reflects
the same blind spot for systematic risk that permeates corporate law and antitrust
debates. As Part III explored, antitrust traditionalists argue that any proposals to
expand the consumer welfare standard reflect a solution in search of a problem,
while progressives insist that antitrust courts should not abandon their “political,
258. See id. at 504.
259. For a discussion of the prevailing standards, see Christine S. Wilson, Commissioner, Fed. Trade
Comm’n, Keynote Address at George Mason Law Review 22nd Annual Antitrust Symposium, Antitrust at the
Crossroads?, Welfare Standards Underlying Antitrust Enforcement: What You Measure Is What You Get (Feb.
15, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1455663/welfare_standard_speech__cmr-wilson.pdf. See generally Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise, supra note 165.
260. See Newman, supra note 217, at 526.
261. See Bloom, supra note 38 at 1.
262. See id.
263. See id.
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social, and moral goals in their quest for a single economic goal.”264 The case
studies below demonstrate that companies are increasingly collaborating with
competitors to address systematic risks because these risks are financially
material.265
While U.S. enforcement agencies remain trapped in this either/or
paradigm, global antitrust authorities are beginning to see that competition
policy sometimes chills the private sector’s efforts to address systematic
risk. The European Commission, for instance, is debating whether
antitrust policy prevents companies from advancing the goals of the Green
Deal. 266 Commissioner Vestager has stressed that competition policy cannot
replace environmental regulation or tax policy, but nevertheless embraced its
critical importance.267 To harmonize antitrust policy with the Green Deal, the
European Commission asked industry leaders to “provide actual or theoretical
examples of desirable cooperation between firms to support Green Deal
objectives that could not be implemented due to E.U. antitrust risks.”268 With its
focus on narrow, short-term impacts on price and output, antitrust law prevents
companies from addressing systematic risk through collaborations to reduce
plastics, increase biodiversity, and prevent human rights abuses. 269 As this
Article examines more fully below, specific jurisdictions have gone further, with
Austria as the first country to enact a so-called “green” exemption from antitrust
for sustainability agreements.270 While E.U. and U.S. competition law diverge
in notable respects,271 large multinational companies in the United States face
similar challenges.

264. See Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C. L. REV. 551, 551 (2012).
265. See Jacquelyn MacLennan, Mark Gidley, Kathryn Mims & Kate Kelliher, Competitor Collaboration:
from Combatting COVID-19 to the Climate Crisis, WHITE & CASE (Sept. 16, 2020),
https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/sustainability-competition-law/competitor-collaborationcovid-19.
266. See Margrethe Vestager, Exec. Vice President, Eur. Comm’n, Speech at an Event Hosted by MEP
Stephanie Yon-Courtin: The Green Deal and Competition Policy (Sept. 22, 2020), https://ec.europa.eu/
commission/commissioners/2019-2024/vestager/announcements/green-deal-and-competition-policy_en. See
generally EUR. COMM’N, supra note 41.
267. See EUR. COMM’N, supra note 41.
268. See id. at 4.
269. See id.
270. See generally Viktoria H.S.E. Robertson, The World’s First Green Antitrust Provision Shows That
Climate Action Is the Newest Frontier, PROMARKET (Mar. 10, 2022), https://www.promarket.org/2022
/03/10/the-worlds-first-green-antitrust-provision-shows-that-climate-action-is-the-newest-antitrust-frontier/.
271. See generally Anu Bradford, Adam Chilton, Katerina Linos & Alexander Weaver, The Global
Dominance of European Competition Law over American Antitrust Law, 16 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 731
(2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Columbia Law School Faculty Scholarship Repository); Andrew
Guzman, The Case for International Antitrust, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 355 (2004); see also ANU BRADFORD,
THE BRUSSELS EFFECT: HOW THE EUROPEAN UNION RULES THE WORLD 99–130 (2020) (providing a novel
account of the EU’s unilateral power to regulate global markets by imposing higher standards).
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A. THE RISE OF VOLUNTARY INITIATIVES & THEIR LIMITATIONS
In 1987, the United Nations’ Brundtland Commission defined sustainable
development as “that [which] meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”272 With
less than seven years projected before the impacts of climate change
become irreversible, the private sector is under increasing pressure to respond.273
Governments and companies around the world have undertaken a number of
voluntary initiatives to address unsustainable business practices. 274 The most
ambitious and comprehensive are the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs).275 Adopted by all member states in 2015, the SDGs were “explicitly
designed to engage the private sector in addressing the world’s most pressing
challenges.”276 Global companies comprise sixty-nine of the top one hundred
economies in the world.277 Recognizing that the scale of the problems requires
joint efforts with the private sector, SDG Goal #17 emphasizes partnership and
collaboration.278
Unfortunately, many studies conclude that after decades of industry-led
private governance, voluntary standards have only marginally impacted human
rights and the environment.279 Professor David Vogel has observed that these
272. See U.N. DEPT. ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, REPORT OF THE WORLD
COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT: OUR COMMON FUTURE 14 n. 27 (1987), https://sustainable
development.un.org/content/documents/5987our-common-future.pdf.
273. See CLIMATECLOCK, https://climateclock.world (last visited July 31, 2022).
274. See generally David Vogel, Private Global Business Regulation, 11 ANNU. REV. POL. SCI. 261 (2008)
(providing a literature review of voluntary “civil regulations,” including codes and soft laws); see also A. CLAIRE
CUTLER, VIRGINIA HAUFLER & TONY PORTER, PRIVATE AUTHORITY & INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 16 (1st ed.
1999) (providing one of the first comprehensive accounts of global civil regulation and “describing how and
why frameworks for governing international economic transactions are created and maintained by the private
sector”); HIGH MEADOWS INST., supra note 81, at 6 (analyzing over 200 voluntary initiatives: “Over the past
three decades, Partnerships and Industry Initiatives that promote social and environmental goals have become
commonplace in most industry sectors.”).
275. See U.N. Sustainable Development Goals, U.N. DEPT. ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS: SUSTAINABLE DEV.,
https://sdgs.un.org/goals (last visited July 31, 2022) (stating seventeen sustainable development goals, or SDGs,
which are “an urgent call for action by all countries—developed and developing—in a global partnership”); see
also G.A. Res. 70/1 (Oct. 15, 2021).
276. G.A. Res. 70/1, supra note 275.
277. See 69 of the Richest 100 Entities on the Planet Are Corporations, Not Governments, Figures Show,
GLOB. JUST. NOW (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.globaljustice.org.uk/news/2018/oct/17/69-richest-100-entitiesplanet-are-corporations-not-governments-figures-show; Jake Johnson, 157 of World’s 200 Richest Entities Are
Corporations, Not Governments, INEQUALITY.ORG (Oct. 19, 2018), https://inequality.org/research/richestentities-corporations-governments.
278. G.A. Res. 70/1, supra note 275.
279. See Richard Locke, Matthew Amengual & Akshay Mangla, Virtue Out of Necessity? Compliance,
Commitment, and the Improvement of Labor Conditions in Global Supply Chains, 37 POL. SOC’Y 319, 319
(2009) (“Private, voluntary compliance programs, promoted by global corporations and nongovernmental
organizations alike, have produced only modest and uneven improvements in working conditions and labor
rights in most global supply chains.”); see also Genevieve LeBaron & Andreas Ruhmkorf, Steering CSR
Through Home State Regulation: A Comparison of the Impact of the UK Bribery Act and Modern Slavery Act
on Global Supply Chain Governance, 8 GLOB. POL’Y 15, 15 (2017) (“In the case of the Modern Slavery Act,
the triumph of voluntary reporting over more stringent public labour standards seems to have undermined the
effectiveness of recent governance initiatives to address forced labour in global supply chains.”).
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“global civil regulations” suffer from the same deficiencies as international
treaties, which also rely on voluntary compliance. 280 Competition policy has
been largely overlooked as one explanation for why soft law initiatives fall short.
B. WHY DO COMPETITORS WANT TO COLLABORATE?
1.

To Address Human Rights Abuses and Fair Working Conditions

Seeking to fill a void in international law, the United Nations’ Guiding
Principles for Business and Human Rights ask companies to use their “leverage”
to prevent abuses.281 Companies, in turn, have developed human rights standards
through industry collaborations. 282 But the Supreme Court has repeatedly
emphasized that “private standard-setting associations have traditionally been
objects of antitrust scrutiny.”283 To avoid antitrust scrutiny, any industry-wide
standards must be unrestricted and voluntary.284 In other words, participation in
standard-setting organizations must be open to all industry participants and
impose no mandatory compliance obligations. 285 In practice, preventing
competitors from boycotting bad actors for failure to adhere to standards renders
them ineffectual. Voluntary standards can also foster a “race to the bottom”
where less costly initiatives gain more industry support.286
The Worker Rights Consortium (WRC), an international labor rights
organization, 287 seeks to improve wages and working conditions for garment
280. See David Vogel, The Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct: Strengths and Limitations
(2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with UC Berkeley Department of Political Science).
281. For a discussion of the concept of leverage in the U.N. Guiding Principles for Business and Human
Rights, see generally SHIFT, USING LEVERAGE IN BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS TO REDUCE HUMAN RIGHTS RISKS
(2013), https://shiftproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Shift_leverageUNGPs_2013.pdf.
282. For an analysis of the tension between the concept of leverage and competition policy, see ANTONIO
CAPOBIANCO, BARBARA BIJELIC & TYLER GILLARD, COMPETITION LAW AND RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS CONDUCT
6 (2015), https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/global-forum/2015GFRBC-Competition-Law-RBC.pdf (“‘Leverage’
can be exerting acting alone or in co-operation with other entities as a strategy to influence other enterprises to
be more responsible.”).
283. See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500 (1988); Am. Soc’y of Mech.
Eng’rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 570–73 (1982); see also Barak D. Richman, The Antitrust of
Reputation Mechanisms: Institutional Economics and Concerted Refusals to Deal, 95 VA. L. REV. 325, 348
(2009) (“Trade associations that serve important roles in managing an industry’s operation, whether setting
industry rules or controlling access to essential facilities, may run afoul of antitrust prohibitions when deciding
to exclude certain members.”).
284. See, e.g., Maureen K. Ohlhausen, The Elusive Role of Competition in the Standard-Setting Antitrust
Debate, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 93, 130 (2017). See generally AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA Section of Antitrust Law,
Handbook on Antitrust Aspects of Standard Setting (2d ed. 2011) (discussing standard setting and antitrust); see
also Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Joseph M. Sullivan, Esq. (May 20, 1997)
(https://www.justice.gov/archive/atr/public/busreview/1126.htm).
285. See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 658–60 (1961) (finding that
the American Gas Association’s refusal to certify an individual manufacturer’s gas burner and a utility’s refusal
to sell gas to a manufacturer constituted an unlawful group boycott, as the standards were influenced by
competitors and did not use objective measures); see also Scott, Antitrust and Socially Responsible
Collaboration, supra note 200, at 127 (discussing several industry initiatives).
286. See Scott, Antitrust and Socially Responsible Collaboration, supra note 200, at 138.
287. See WORKER RIGHTS CONSORTIUM, https://www.workersrights.org (last visited July 31, 2022).
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factory workers by specifying a code of fair labor practices. The DOJ initially
threatened to bring an antitrust enforcement action against it, but the WRC
worked for several years to make the necessary concessions.288 The resulting
modifications effectively stripped the WRC of its sting by requiring that any
action taken against non-compliant suppliers be voluntary and non-collective.289
This resolution reflects a cautious tone and renders any impact necessarily
marginal.290 If it implicated a large enough share of the labor market to impact
sales price, the outcome would likely be different.291
These antitrust limitations continue to hamstring the apparel industry’s
attempts to create ethical products. The Sustainable Apparel Coalition, “the
apparel, footwear, and textile industry’s leading alliance for sustainable
production,” warns that “[u]nder general antitrust laws, the Coalition cannot
coordinate or instruct members how to operate with customers or suppliers or
competitors.”292 And the Better Cotton Initiative, an industry initiative aimed at
producing sustainable cotton, prohibits its members from “enter[ing] into any
agreement, arrangement, or understanding among themselves to refrain, or to
encourage others to refrain, from purchasing any materials, product, equipment,
services or other supplies from any supplier or vendor, or from dealing with any
supplier or vendor.”293
2.

To Promote Conservation and Ensure the Long-Term Sustainability
of Scarce Resources

The tension between conservation and antitrust law has been recognized
by surprisingly few scholars. 294 But, as Professor Jonathan Adler sums up,
“what conservation demands, antitrust condemns.”295 Professor Adler focuses
extensively on marine fisheries, which present a classic “Tragedy of the
288. See Letter from Sharis A. Pozen, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just. Antitrust Div., to
Donald I. Baker, Baker & Miller PLLC (Dec. 16, 2011) (quoting BYLAWS OF THE WORKERS RIGHTS
CONSORTIUM § 1.2(1) (2010), http://workersrights.org/about/wrc_bylaws.pdf).
289. See Scott, Antitrust and Socially Responsible Collaboration, supra note 200, at 136.
290. See Daniel A. Crane & Ben Kobren, Making Antitrust Help, Not Harm Workers Abroad, THE HILL:
CONG. BLOG (Apr. 28, 2015), https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/labor/240231-making-antitrust-help-notharm-workers-abroad.
291. Id.
292. See Amina Razvi, Common Questions About the SAC, SUSTAINABLE APPAREL COAL. (Sept. 2020),
https://apparelcoalition.org/common-questions-about-the-sac.
293. See Antitrust Policy, BETTER COTTON INITIATIVE (Sept. 2, 2009), https://bettercotton.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/06/BCI_Antitrust_Policy_final_eng_ex.pdf.
294. See Jonathan H. Adler, Conservation Through Collusion: Antitrust as an Obstacle to Marine Resource
Conservation, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 8 (2004) (identifying the conflict between the goals of antitrust and a
cooperative’s efforts to conserve fish through output restraints and the goals of antitrust); see also Scott, Antitrust
and Socially Responsible Collaboration, supra note 200, at 127 (arguing that the threat of antitrust liability
“chills” certain forms of environmental collaboration in private industry); Light, supra note 51, at 149 (“Small
changes in how federal courts interpret antitrust law, such as acknowledging the environmental benefits of
industry cooperation, could remove disincentives for meaningful cooperation aimed at addressing cumulative
harms that degrade common pool resources.”).
295. See Adler, supra note 294, at 24.
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Commons” scenario.296 Cooperative fisheries have historically faced antitrust
scrutiny for their efforts to prevent overharvesting by self-regulating output.297
In Manaka v. Monterey Sardine Industries, the court squarely rejected that
output restrictions could provide a procompetitive justification as necessary to
the sustainability of the sardine population:
Such an association as that of the boat owners is not freed from the restrictive
provisions of the antitrust act, because they profess in the interest of
conservation of important food fish to regulate the price and the manner of
taking such fish “unauthorized by legislation and uncontrolled by proper
authority.298

By 1952, the Monterey sardine fishery population had collapsed to the
detriment of consumers.299 As Professor Adler has argued, this could have been
prevented if the court had considered conservation as a procompetitive
justification under the rule of reason standard, rather than dogmatically applying
the per se rule to an output restriction.300
Overharvesting threatened the viability of several fish species in the
1990s.301 Fish-harvesting cooperatives responded by working with the DOJ to
form the cooperative Pacific Whiting Conservation Cooperative (PWCC). 302
The DOJ blessed this agreement after concluding that it “seems unlikely to
reduce output or increase price under any likely scenario.”303 Notwithstanding
the agreement’s positive impacts, antitrust still prevents these collectives from
agreeing to a total catch limit below the level the government has already set.304
The conflict between antitrust and conservation is also playing out
globally. The Amazon Soybean Moratorium, a commitment by Brazilian firms
to refrain from purchasing soybeans from certain parts of the rainforest, has been
lauded as “one of the great conservation successes of the twenty-first century,”
resulting in an 84% decrease in deforestation.305 Brazilian farmers have recently
complained to the local competition agency, Conselho Administrativo de Defesa

296. See id.
297. See id. at 25, 39 (arguing that while there is now a federal antitrust exemption for fishing cooperatives,
the Fisherman’s Collective Marketing Act (FCMA), 15 U.S.C. § 521, it is too narrow, because it only exempts
specified activities if an “otherwise legal cooperative marketing association could not engage in otherwise
prohibited boycotts or concerted refusals to deal with noncooperating dealers”).
298. 41 F. Supp. 531, 534 (N.D. Cal. 1941) (citation omitted).
299. Unfortunately, similar stories played out in Mississippi, California, and Massachusetts. See Adler,
supra note 294, at 26–33.
300. See id. at 33.
301. See Andrew Jacobs, China’s Appetite Pushes Fisheries to the Brink, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2017, at A1
(“Overfishing is depleting oceans across the globe, with 90 percent of the world’s fisheries fully exploited or
facing collapse.”).
302. See Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Att’y Gen. to Joseph M. Sullivan, Esq. (May 20, 1997),
https://www.justice.gov/archive/atr/public/busreview/1126.htm.
303. See id.
304. See id; see also Scott, Antitrust and Socially Responsible Collaboration, supra note 200, at 128.
305. See generally Robert Heilmayr, Lisa L. Rausch, Jacob Munger & Holly K. Gibbs, Brazil’s Amazon Soy
Moratorium Reduced Deforestation, 1 NATURE FOOD 801 (2020).
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Econômica (CADE), that this agreement restrains trade by restricting output in
violation of competition policy.306 A similar story played out in Indonesia when,
in 2016, the Indonesian competition authority threatened to fine palm-oil traders
who had decided not to buy palm oil from farmers who engaged in illegal
deforestation.307
3.

To Control Pollution

In 2019, the DOJ investigated automakers who sought to meet California’s
fuel efficiency standards despite federal rollbacks. As discussed above, the
investigation was widely decried as partisan.308 The DOJ dismissed the probe
after antitrust scholars and practitioners reached consensus that it
would present “significant hurdles.”309 Although compliance with California’s
standards would increase costs, there was no indication those costs would be
passed along to consumers.310 Any coordination among competitors on price,
however, would be a textbook example of collusion in violation of antitrust law.
In 1969, automakers learned this the hard way when they coordinated to avoid a
first mover disadvantage associated with introducing emissions reduction
technology in their vehicles.311
Although the DOJ dismissed this probe,312 given our increasingly divided
political environment, the risk of partisan antitrust looms large. Just consider the
scrutiny that investor boycotts of fossil fuel companies are receiving.313 The
financial sector has recently “started moving in parallel to cut off liquidity and

306. See Nicole Kar, Competition Rules Stymie Co-Operation on Climate Goals, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2020),
https://www.ft.com/content/b3e0da9c-3eba-11ea-b84f-a62c46f39bc2. See generally Heilmayr et al., supra note
305.
307. Jonathan Vit, Under Gov’t Pressure, Palm Oil Giants Disband Green Pledge, MONGABAY (July 1,
2016), https://news.mongabay.com/2016/07/under-government-pressure-palm-oil-giants-disband-green-pledge
/; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Are Agreements to Address Climate Change Anticompetitive?, REGUL. REV.
(Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.theregreview.org/2019/09/11/hovenkamp-are-regulatory-agreements-to-addressclimate-change-anticompetitive [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Agreements to Address Climate Change].
308. See generally Paul Balmer, Colluding to Save the World: How Antitrust Laws Discourage
Corporations from Taking Action on Climate Change, 47 ECOLOGY L.Q. 219 (2020); Dailey C. Koga, Teamwork
or Collusion? Changing Antitrust Law to Permit Corporate Action on Climate Change, 95 WASH. L. REV. 1989
(2020); see also Dailey C. Koga, Comment, Teamwork or Collusion? Changing Antitrust Law to Permit
Corporate Action on Climate Change, 95 WASH L. REV. 1989, 1990 (2020); Hiroko Tabuchi & Coral Davenport,
Justice Dept. Investigates California Emissions Pact That Embarrassed Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/06/climate/automakers-california-emissions-antitrust.html.
309. See Hovenkamp, Agreements to Address Climate Change, supra note 307.
310. See id.
311. See United States v. Auto. Mfrs. Ass’n, 307 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal. 1969). For a discussion of this
case, see Light, supra note 51, at 172–74; see also David Andrews, Antitrust Law Meets the Environmental
Crisis—An Argument for Accommodation, 1 ECOLOGY L.Q. 840, 859–60 (1971).
312. See David McLaughlin & Jennifer A Dlouhy, U.S. Closes Antitrust Probe of Carmakers over Emissions
Pact, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-02-07/u-s-closes-antitrustprobe-of-automakers-over-emissions-deal.
313. See C. Boyden Gray, Banks’ Energy Boycott Is an Antitrust Problem, WALL ST. J., July 14, 2020, at
A19. See generally Inara Scott, The Trouble with Boycotts: Can Fossil Fuel Divest Campaigns Be Prohibited?,
57 AM. BUS. L. J. 537 (2020) [hereinafter Scott, The Trouble with Boycotts].
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capital to America’s energy sector.”314 This effort involves large banks from
Citibank to Goldman Sachs, as well as investor alliances like Climate Action
100+. Critics warn that it reflects an effort to “collude on a boycott of a critical
segment of the U.S. economy” in violation of antitrust law.315 It is important to
remember that just like corporations, investor coalitions also risk antitrust
scrutiny for prosocial collaboration. Proponents of these investor initiatives
argue that, given the prominence of climate change in the public debate, these
“environmental goals” should be protected as political speech under the First
Amendment. 316 Net-zero alliances are facing the same ire from Republican
attorneys general. 317 But many large asset managers and financial regulators
recognize that climate change is a systematic and financially material risk.318
C. RECENT EXAMPLES FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION
The COVID-19 pandemic has forced global competition enforcers to
acknowledge the tension between competition policy and prosocial
collaboration.319 From vaccine development and distribution to the delivery of
personal protective equipment (PPE), the pandemic has also caused companies
to collaborate with competitors.320 In many cases, these conflicts can easily be
resolved under existing law, either because the prosocial collaboration is in fact
procompetitive or because it is being done at the behest of the government to
address an emergency situation.321 These cases merely require that competition
authorities provide clarification through guidance or expedited comfort
letters.322 Some jurisdictions have recently gone even further and provided a
314. See Gray, supra note 313.
315. See id.
316. See Scott, The Trouble with Boycotts, supra note 313, at 564.
317. Alastair Marsh, Net-Zero Insurers Uncover New Climate Adversary in Antitrust Law, BLOOMBERG
(Jan. 19, 2022, 1:40 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-01-19/net-zero-insurance-coal-exitplans-impeded-by-antitrust-laws.
318. See, e.g., VEENA RAMANI, ADDRESSING CLIMATE AS A SYSTEMIC RISK: A CALL TO ACTION FOR
FINANCIAL REGULATORS 44 (2020), https://www.ceres.org/sites/default/files/reports/2020-06/Financial%20
Regulators%20FULL%20FINAL.pdf.
319. See Barak Orbach, Antitrust in the Shadow of Market Disruptions, 34 ANTITRUST ABA J. 32, 32 (2020)
(analyzing “the relationship between competition policy and large-scale market disruptions” which includes
pandemics); MacLennan et al., supra note 265.
320. See Biopharma Leaders to Unite to Stand with Science, BUS. WIRE (Sept. 8, 2020, 6:30 AM),
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20200908005282/en (stating that biopharma CEOs have pledged to
defer competition on vaccine); see also Barak Orbach, On the Covid-19 Vaccine Corporate Pledge, HARV. L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Sept. 10, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/09/10/on-the-covid-19vaccine-corporate-pledge (discussing antitrust concerns raised by pledge).
321. See Reducing Antitrust Risk of Collaborations During the COVID-19 Pandemic, HOGAN LOVELLS
(Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.hoganlovells.com/~/media/hogan-lovells/pdf/2020-pdfs/2020_04_23_acer_alert_
reducing_antitrust_risk_of_collaborations_during_the_covid_19_pandemic.pdf?la=en; Orbach, supra note 319,
at 32 (analyzing “the relationship between competition policy and large-scale market disruptions” which
includes pandemics); MacLennan et al., supra note 265.
322. See Frances Murphy, Izzet Sinan, Christina Renner & Joanna Christoforou, COVID-19: The Return of
the ‘Comfort Letter’, MORGAN LEWIS (May 1, 2020), https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/2020/05/covid-19the-return-of-the-comfort-letter-cv19-lf.
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temporary “safe harbor” or blanket exemption for certain industries or activities,
from transportation to manufacturing PPE.323 While these efforts can provide a
stop-gap to allow markets to navigate COVID-19, they have also triggered
debate as to whether competition policy is adaptable enough to address other
risks like climate change.
This conversation around competition policy is nascent in the United
States. 324 But in the European Union, there is a sense of urgency to address
competition policy’s potentially chilling effect on the private sector’s efforts to
meet ambitious Green Deal milestones.325 The European Commission’s recent
call for contributions reflects this exigency: “We’ll be looking for ideas, not just
from competition experts, but from everyone with a stake in this issue. . . . We
need to work—and listen—fast.” 326 Law firms, seeing an uptick in clients
pursuing sustainability goals, are weighing in.327 The global law firm Linklaters
recently commissioned a survey of over two-hundred sustainability leaders in
the United Kingdom, Europe, and the United States to assess whether
competition policy was chilling prosocial collaboration.328 Ninety-three percent
wanted to work with peers to achieve sustainability goals, but fifty-seven percent
of sustainability leaders had forgone specific sustainability projects because the
antitrust risk was too high.329 Survey respondents reiterated that collaboration
with industry peers advances their sustainability goals by allowing them to pool
resources and share expertise, develop new industry norms, and scale their
impact. By observing specific scenarios, the conflicts that companies face
become obvious.
1. To Create Sufficient Demand for Sustainable Products
This Article is not the first to bemoan the dearth
of behavioral economics in competition policy.330 While the consumer welfare
323. See Mark R. Butscha, Jr., Michael W. Jahnke, & Thomas F. Zych, FTC and DOJ Announce Expedited
Procedure to Provide Antitrust Guidance to Businesses Responding to COVID-19 Pandemic, THOMSPON HINE
(Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.thompsonhine.com/publications/ftc-and-doj-announce-expedited-procedure-toprovide-antitrust-guidance-to-businesses-responding-to-covid-19-pandemic.
324. See LINKLATERS, COMPETITION LAW NEEDS TO COOPERATE: COMPANIES WANT CLARITY TO ENABLE
CLIMATE CHANGE INITIATIVES TO BE PURSUED (2020), https://www.linklaters.com/en-us/insights/publications/
2020/april/competition-law-needs-to-cooperate-companies-want-clarity-to-enable-climate-change
(“Beyond
Europe, neither the environmental commitment nor the timeline for competition authorities to engage (or not) is
as clear.”).
325. See Vestager, supra note 266.
326. See id.
327. See id.
328. See LINKLATERS, supra note 324.
329. See id.
330. See generally Stephen Martin, Chapter 15: Behavioral Antitrust, in HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 404–54 (Victor J. Tremblay, Elizabeth Schroeder & Carol Horton Tremblay eds.,
2018), https://www.elgaronline.com/view/edcoll/9781784718978/9781784718978.00022.xml; see also Max
Huffman, Marrying Neo-Chicago with Behavioral Antitrust, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 105, 120 (2012); Brent A.
Kaplan, Brett W Gelino & Derek D. Reed, A Behavioral Economic Approach to Green Consumerism: Demand
for Reusable Shopping Bags, 27 BEHAV. & SOC. ISSUES 20, 27 (2017).
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standard dominates antitrust enforcement globally, consumer preferences are
notoriously difficult to pin down. Ambivalent consumer behavior towards
sustainable products is belied by an ostensible preference for such products in
surveys. Behavioral economics attributes this discrepancy to various factors,
including hyperbolic discounting.331 According to this theory, when consumers
have a choice of two products, they will tend to decide quickly but fail to account
for the long-term impact of their decisions.332
An example from Unilever illustrates this phenomenon. Unilever invested
in R&D to create a sustainably sourced deodorant, allowing it to offer consumers
the same amount of product at the same cost, but with less packaging.333 Less
packaging reduced production costs, shipping costs, and the overall amount of
waste or recycling material.334 Unilever was the first to market and make the
product’s technology publicly available, thereby encouraging its competitors to
make more sustainable products. Despite Unilever’s efforts at marketing and
consumer education, consumers chose to buy the product in the larger package,
assuming that they were getting more value for their dollar. 335 The product
launch failed.336
Moreover, as Unilever learned the hard way, coordinating with competitors
to offer a more sustainably packaged product is a per se antitrust violation. In
the infamous “detergent cartel” case, the European Commission fined Unilever,
Henkel, and Procter and Gamble over 315 million euros for violating antitrust
laws. 337 The companies defended their conduct on sustainability grounds. 338
They wanted to wean consumers off of detergent which came in large packaging
and required hot water to ones that would reduce energy use and come in smaller
packaging.339 Concerned that consumers would not pay the same price for a
product sold in smaller quantities, the companies agreed not to raise their prices
and to launch their products at the same time.340 Coordinating with competitors
on price and product launches is precisely the sort of behavior that antitrust law
seeks to prevent. The European Commission argued that the detergent
companies (1) agreed to indirectly increase prices (by keeping prices the same
when products were compacted), (2) agreed to exclude certain types of
promotions (considered a form of price-fixing) during different phases of the
331. Ariel Rubenstein, “Economics and Psychology”? The Case of Hyperbolic Discounting, 44 INT’L
ECON. REV. 1207, 1208 (2003).
332. Id. at 1209.
333. FOODDRINKEUROPE, supra note 7, at 2 n.1; UNILEVER, SUSTAINABILITY COOPERATIONS BETWEEN
COMPETITORS & ART. 101 TFEU 1, 4, https://www.unilever.com/Images/unilever_submission_sustainability
_competition_law_tcm244-551751_en.pdf.
334. FOODDRINKEUROPE, supra note 7, at 2 n.1; UNILEVER, supra note 333, at 4.
335. FOODDRINKEUROPE, supra note 7, at 2 n.1.
336. Id.
337. See Elina Laurinen, The Consumer Detergents Cartel, COMPETITION POL’Y NEWSL., Jan.–Apr. 2011,
at 3.
338. Id.; UNILEVER, supra note 333, at 4.
339. Id.; FOODDRINKEUROPE, supra note 7, at 2 n. 1.
340. FOODDRINKEUROPE, supra note 7, at 1–2.

August 2022

PROSOCIAL ANTITRUST

1683

environmental initiative, (3) agreed to increase prices at a specific time and
market in order of market leadership, and (4) exchanged sensitive pricing and
trading conditions information, fostering more types of price collusion.341
Unilever’s failed launch exposed the limitations of unilateral action. While
economists have long focused on the benefits of a first mover advantage,
sustainable brands often face a first mover disadvantage, leading to
failed product launches.342 For instance, reminiscent of Unilever’s example, the
German retailer Lidl recently walked away from its commitment to selling only
Fairtrade bananas in its 3,200 stores.343 Applying a similar logic, the first mover
disadvantage might also hamper the ability of airlines to replace old aircraft with
more environmentally sustainable plane.344 This transition will reduce emissions
but invariably lead to higher ticket prices, potentially incentivizing companies
to attempt to wait it out.
Understandably, consumer rights advocates and competition authorities are
unmoved by these examples and offer many rebuttals. They claim competition
law is meant to protect consumers.345 If consumers do not want the products,
then why should we permit private actors to impose paternalistic limitations on
consumer choice, particularly when higher prices disproportionately impact
poorer consumers? Importantly, these private actors and the competition
authorities are not accountable in any way to these consumers. If we want to
limit consumer choice, legislation enacted through the democratic process is the
appropriate process. This Article does not seek to discount these important
critiques. But, as is explored more fully in Part IV, we should not jettison the
benefits of prosocial collaboration so quickly.
2. To Produce Sufficient Quantities of Sustainable Goods at Scale
The examples above highlight a market failure in the insufficient consumer
demand for sustainable products. However, there is a market failure at play on
the supply side, as well. It is often impossible for companies to bring a
sustainable product to market without collaborating with competitors to achieve
sufficient scale. The plastic waste crisis represents the increasingly disastrous
side-effect of this limitation. Plastic recycling legislation is being enacted
globally, and many companies are entering into voluntary commitments that go
above these legal mandates.346 Notwithstanding these strides, the infrastructure
341. See id.
342. See William Boulding & Markus Christen, First-Mover Disadvantage, HARV. BUS. REV., Oct. 2001.
343. See Lidl Backs Away from Fairtrade Bananas, BANANALINK (May 20, 2019),
https://www.bananalink.org.uk/news/lidl-backs-away-from-fairtrade-bananas.
344. IN-HOUSE COMPETITION L. ASS’N, CONTRIBUTION LETTER ON COMPETITION POLICY SUPPORTING THE
E.U. GREEN DEAL CALL FOR CONTRIBUTIONS 1, 2 (Nov. 20, 2020), http://competitionlawyer.
co.uk/ICLA/Documents_files/201120%20-%20ICLA%20Input%20-%20Competition%20Policy%20
supporting%20the%20Green%20Deal_1.pdf.
345. See generally Joshua D. Wright, The Antitrust/Consumer Protection Paradox: Two Policies at War
with Each Other, 121 YALE L.J. 2216 (2012).
346. FOODDRINKEUROPE, supra note 7, at 1 (discussing the first mover disadvantage).
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for recycling plastic remains nascent, and many companies will simply fail to
meet these goals without such laws.347 In 2018, the European food and drink
industry consumed eight million metric tons of plastic packaging, resulting in a
cumulative 16.8 billion kilos of European plastic packaging waste.348 Yet, there
is currently a global shortage of affordable food-contact recycled plastic.349 To
overcome this shortage, competitors could jointly finance recycling
infrastructure, including funding third-party recycling facilities. To avoid a freerider problem, however, these companies would have to agree to a mandatory
commitment to purchase all of the plastics collected and sourced from specific
facilities. A mandatory commitment to source plastic from specific suppliers is
a textbook example of anticompetitive conduct.350 Similar to plastic producers,
leather tanneries won’t make the investment necessary to make sustainable
leather without sufficient demand. But leather producers who compete
horizontally cannot make these mandatory commitments due to competition
policy.351 A similar logic can be applied to airlines, which have recently faced
public scrutiny for their carbon footprint.352 Airlines could, for example, enter
into industry-wide commitments to demand that suppliers invest in greener
production. But, to incentivize sufficient production, airlines may have to enter
into mandatory joint purchasing agreements, raising the specter of antitrust.
3. To Phase Out Unsustainable Products
As discussed above, competition policy prevents companies from setting
mandatory industry-wide standards. But as scholars and NGOs have lamented,
voluntary standards feebly affect meaningful change.353 This challenge has led
to an impasse. It is not surprising that E.U. companies are gun shy about
mandatory standard setting when failed initiatives like “Chicken of Tomorrow”
loom large.354 Chicken of Tomorrow was an initiative by farmers, supermarkets,
and meat processors that sought to improve animal welfare conditions

347. Id. at 3, 4.
348. See ING ECON. DEP’T., PLASTIC PACKAGING IN THE FOOD SECTOR 5 (2019), https://think.
ing.com/uploads/reports/ING_-_The_plastic_puzzle_-_December_2019_(003).pdf;
FOODDRINKEUROPE,
DECARBONISATION ROAD MAP FOR THE EUROPEAN FOOD AND DRINK MANUFACTURING SECTOR (2021),
https://www.fooddrinkeurope.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Decarbonising-the-European-food-and-drinkmanufacturing-sector.pdf.
349. FOODDRINKEUROPE, supra note 7, at 5.
350. Id. at 3.
351. See IN-HOUSE COMPETITION L. ASS’N, supra note 344, at 2.
352. Jessica Baron, Flight-Shaming Is Now a Thing – Will It Keep You From Traveling?, FORBES (July 2,
2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jessicabaron/2019/07/02/flight-shaming-is-now-a-thing--will-it-keep-youfrom-traveling/?sh=25b8a1fe71a3.
353. See generally David Vogel, Private Global Business Regulation, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 261 (2008)
(providing a literature review of voluntary “civil regulations” including codes and soft laws).
354. See Industry-Wide Arrangements for the So-Called Chicken of Tomorrow Restrict Competition, NETH.
AUTH. FOR CONSUMERS & MKTS. (Jan. 26, 2015), https://www.acm.nl/en/publications/publication/13761/
Industry-wide-arrangements-for-the-so-called-Chicken-of-Tomorrow-restrict-competition.
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by adopting mandatory, industry-wide standards.355 Supermarkets agreed only
to buy chicken that complied with the measures. 356 The Dutch Competition
Authority concluded that this violated Dutch and E.U. competition laws
because it reduced supply and increased costs.357 Along similar lines, the Dutch
Competition Authority found that an agreement between four large competing
electricity producers to voluntarily shut down coal plants to reduce emissions
violated competition laws since it increased energy prices and reduced the Dutch
energy production capacity by 10%.358
The submissions described a myriad of ambitious mandatory, industrywide, standard-setting proposals designed to address climate change. The food
industry could reduce plastic waste by requiring all industry participants to
abandon virgin plastics, reduce energy consumption by creating frozen products
that require lower freezer temperatures, or protect soil degradation by requiring
all farmers to use regenerative and low carbon farming practices, and excluding
suppliers that refuse to remediate.359 Additionally, European wood processors
could address deforestation by entering into an industry-wide mutually binding
and mandatory agreement to only buy wood from preapproved regions on a
“green list.”360 These wood processors proposed investing a portion of sales to
enforce compliance, which would necessitate a fixed surcharge on sales to
compensate for additional costs.361 Similarly, the European paper industry wants
to develop mandatory stricter standards to enhance sustainability, including a
commitment not to use coating designed for hot beverages on drinking water
cups, or a mandatory agreement to phase out less sustainable products like nonrecyclable papers. 362 To the extent that these efforts are currently initiated
through non-binding guidelines and recommendations, they are falling short.363
The inability to set mandatory standards is also severely hampering progress on
addressing human rights abuses in the supply chain. The European food and
drink industry could agree to mandatory rules for plastic packaging that would
improve recyclability.364 It could also agree to integrate new technologies for

355. Id.
356. Id.
357. See Letter from Spanish Ass’n for Def. of Competition to EU Comm., Contribution to the European
Commission’s
Consultation
on
Competition
Policy
Supporting
the
Green
Deal
4,
http://www.aedc.es/documento/aedc-contribution-to-the-european-commissions-consultation-on-competitionpolicy-supporting-the-green-deal/.
358. See id. at 5.
359. See UNILEVER, supra note 333.
360. Letter from Am. Chamber of Com. to EU Comm., Consultation Response: Competition Contributing
to the European Green Deal 4, https://www.amchameu.eu/system/files/position_papers/amcham_eu_comp_
contributing_to_the_egd_response.pdf.
361. See id.
362. See Confederation of Eur. Paper Indus., Contribution Letter on Competition Policy Supporting the EU
Green Deal Call for Contributions 4 (Nov. 19, 2020), https://ec.europa.eu/competition/information/
green_deal/index_en.html.
363. See id.
364. See FOODDRINKEUROPE, supra note 7, at 6, 9.
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sorting food-contact and non-food-contact plastic packaging waste like digital
watermarking and fluorescent markers.365 Mandatory standards raise important
antitrust concerns given that they create barriers to entry. But they are also
increasingly necessary to address financially material ESG risks, creating a
fundamental tension between business realities and antitrust law.
4. To Address Sustainability and Human Rights Challenges
Competition policy also prevents companies from sharing competitively
sensitive information. It is difficult to implement joint efforts to address human
rights abuses in the supply chain without this data. Admittedly, there is a number
of workarounds, including using anonymized or aggregated data sets. But often,
the anonymity of the information removes its usefulness. For example, AB Inbev
could enter into logistics collaborations and data sharing with other
beverage or fast-moving consumer goods companies to improve efficiencies.366
These agreements would enable companies to reduce distances traveled and
therefore emissions.367 However, delivery routes are considered commercially
sensitive information. 368 Of course, AB Inbev can, and sometimes does, 369
conduct this coordination through a third party. But that adds an additional cost,
rendering potential collaborations commercially infeasible.
Often, commercially sensitive information necessarily relates to cost. For
example, the food industry wants to collaborate on the cost-benefit analysis of
switching to more sustainable packaging.370 This granular data would provide
detailed information on the environmental impact and costs and is therefore
considered competitively sensitive.371
D. WHY REGULATION ALONE CAN’T ADDRESS SYSTEMIC RISKS
Before turning to policy recommendations, this Part concludes by
addressing why companies cannot advocate for various policy goals by
lobbying for regulation.372 After all, that is why the Noerr-Pennington exception
immunizes private entities from liability under the antitrust laws for
collaborating to influence new laws or regulation, or the enforcement of existing
ones.373 Importantly, the exception applies even if the intent or actual impact of
365. See id. at 6.
366. See Letter from Ben Graham, Eur. Legal Dir., AB InBev, Contribution Letter on Competition Policy
Supporting the EU Green Deal Call for Contributions (Nov. 2020) (on file with author).
367. See id.
368. See id.
369. See id.
370. FoodDrinkEurope Submission—Farm2Fork Consultation, FOODDRINKEUROPE (Dec. 3, 2020),
https://www.fooddrinkeurope.eu/resource/fooddrinkeuropes-submission-farm2fork-consultation.
371. See FOODDRINKEUROPE, supra note 7, at 12.
372. See Hovenkamp, Progressive Antitrust, supra note 138, at 78, 112 (“Concerns with wealth distribution,
universal service, or management of risk are all legitimate regulatory goals for progressive statutory intervention,
although not for antitrust.”).
373. See supra Part III.B.
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the legislation is anticompetitive. 374 Competitors are free to lobby for lower
emissions standards, a ban on single-use plastic, stricter human rights due
diligence, or a generous federal minimum wage.
This Article does not disagree that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine offers
businesses a powerful tool that they should and do utilize, nor does it dispute or
discount the value of regulation. But regulation does not replace the
complimentary and unique role that antitrust policy should play. As this Article
has argued, the claim that regulation is better at addressing “environmental” or
“social” issues relies on the false presumption that actions to address these issues
are not procompetitive and welfare-enhancing. This Article emphatically agrees
that antitrust law should remain firmly tethered to economic considerations. To
honor this devotion, though, courts and enforcement agencies must honestly
account for the economic impacts of climate change and other systematic risks.
There are other obvious shortcomings of regulation. First, passing it in the
first place is often impractical or impossible. In fact, Congress has
not successfully passed a comprehensive environmental law since the 1990s.375
With respect to climate change, fossil fuel companies that are benefiting the
most from externalizing their negative environmental impacts are also the ones
that tend to influence lawmakers and regulators through lobbying and campaign
contributions.376 To the frustration of large diversified shareholders, there is also
limited visibility into the fossil fuel industry’s influence over lawmakers and
regulators due to a lack of mandatory disclosure obligations for corporate
lobbying practices.377 It should come as no surprise that shareholder proposals
seeking to increase transparency on corporate political activities won in record
numbers in the 2021 proxy season.378
Second, as the case studies discussed in Part IV stressed, “legislation may
provide the framework for action but leave the practical consequences to
businesses that may struggle to achieve compliance with regulatory
requirements unilaterally . . . .”379 Third, for multinational companies, the need
for collaboration is often driven by a lack of influence on human rights or
environmental regulation in local jurisdictions where the climate change and
human rights impacts are being felt.380
374. See supra Part III.B.
375. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 132–33
(2013) (advocating for private environmental governance and noting that Congress has not passed meaningful
environmental reform since 1990).
376. See Steve Cohen, Scott Pruitt, Andrew Wheeler, and Regulatory Capture at the EPA, COLUM. CLIMATE
SCH.: BLOG (Apr. 16, 2018), https://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2018/04/16/pruitt-wheeler-regulatory-capture-epa.
377. See Press Release, Ceres, Major U.S. Investors Call on Largest Corporate Emitters to Disclose How
Their Climate Lobbying Aligns with Climate Science (Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.ceres.org/news-center/pressreleases/major-us-investors-call-largest-corporate-emitters-disclose-how-their.
378. See H. Rodgin Cohen & Melissa Sawyer, Corporate Political Contributions, HAR. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (Feb. 3, 2021), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/02/03/corporate-political-contributions.
379. See FOODDRINKEUROPE, supra note 7, at 2.
380. See, e.g., Pacheco, George Schoneveld, Ahmad Dermawan, Heru Komarudin & Marcel Djama,
Governing Sustainable Palm Oil Supply: Disconnects, Complementarities, and Antagonisms Between State
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Consumer rights advocates advance a related critique that private industry
and regulators are not democratically accountable to consumers and, therefore,
shouldn’t make ethical decisions for them.381 Consumers, they argue, ought to
have the freedom to make those decisions through their buying decisions.382
While that is an important critique, this Article takes issue with it on several
grounds. First, the low prices that the consumer welfare standard incentivizes
disproportionately inflict negative externalities on the most vulnerable
consumers in the form of polluted air or water, among other negative impacts.383
Although both wealthy and poor consumers typically pay the same prices for the
same goods, the poorest consumers effectively subsidize those low prices. 384
Often, those costs are also borne by communities of color.385 Moreover, relying
on low prices as a tool for wealth distribution and economic empowerment raises
a critique reminiscent of an argument that Professor Abbye Atkinson makes
with respect to relying on “credit as [a] social provision.”386 Similar to credit,
upholding consumer price as a normative goal reflects our tendency to overly
rely on market-based solutions as an “expedient diversion from the more
difficult and intractable” questions concerning economic inequality.387
A third critique that is practical rather than normative maintains that
measuring a standard broader than consumer welfare is far more difficult than

Regulations and Private Standards, 14 REGUL. & GOVERNANCE 568, 580 (2020); Ronnie D. Lipschutz, Global
Civil Society and Global Governmentality: Or, the Search for Politics and the State Amidst the Capillaries of
Social Power, in POWER IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 229–248 (Michael Barnett & Raymond Duvall eds., 2004)
(discussing private civil regulation or self-regulation by companies as an effort “to compensate for the decreasing
capacities of national governments for providing public goods.”).
381. See, e.g., Joseph Congilio, Economizing the Totalitarian Temptation: A Risk-Averse Liberal Realism
for Political Economy and Competition Policy in a Post-Neoliberal Society, 59 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 703, 717
(2020) (“By seeking to correct individual preferences and market biases, libertarian paternalism would seem to
support an antitrust regime that, in effect, goes beyond a conduct requirement and addresses outcomes directly
for their failure to meet prior socio-economic goals.”).
382. EUR. CONSUMER ORG., CONSUMERS AT THE CENTRE OF THE DRIVE TO SUSTAINABILITY: BEUC’S VIEW
ON THE EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL 5 (2020), https://www.beuc.eu/publications/beuc-x-2020-012_beuc_final_
position_on_european_green_deal.pdf.
383. See Press Release, Data-Driven Lab, Most Cities Burdening Low-income Residents with Unfair Share
of Environmental Hazards (Feb. 6, 2020), https://datadrivenlab.org/featured/press-release-most-citiesburdening-low-income-residents-with-unfair-share-of-environmental-hazards-according-to-index-that-willlaunch-at-the-world-urban-forum-on-feb-9.
384. Id.
385. See Maxine Burkett, Just Solutions to Climate Change: A Climate Justice Proposal for a Domestic
Clean Development Mechanism, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 169, 170 (2008); Nishan Degnarain, Ten Ways That Racial
and Environmental Justice Are Inextricably Linked, FORBES (June 30, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
nishandegnarain/2020/06/30/eight-ways-that-the-fight-for-racial-and-environmental-justice-are-inextricablylinked/?sh=58a1c6873213.
386. See Abbye Atkinson, Rethinking Credit as Social Provision, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1093, 1098 (2019)
(“Thus, even as these advocates fight for economically disenfranchised communities, they do so in inherently
market-based terms.”).
387. Id. at 1098, 1134 (“This notion of credit as social provision for the working poor is deeply flawed.”).
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the alternative.388 Unfortunately, a tendency to resist accounting for the financial
impacts of environmental and social risks because of its inherent difficulty
stymies progress in corporate law and securities disclosure, as well.389 But the
challenges of measuring systematic risk can no longer be a reason for seeking
comfort in standards that ignore and conflict with market realities. After all,
large asset managers and insurance companies are employing tools like total cost
accounting and externality pricing to inform their own business and investment
decisions.390 These problems are difficult, but not insurmountable. The next Part
calls on antitrust to embrace this challenge and articulates how antitrust
enforcement agencies and courts could enhance the consumer welfare analysis
to incorporate systematic risks.

V. THE UNIVERSAL CONSUMER STANDARD
A. INCORPORATING SYSTEMATIC RISKS INTO THE MARKET FAILURE TEST
As this Article introduced in Part III, the current market failure test cannot
account for systematic portfolio-wide risks.391 This limitation is attributable to
the market failure test’s reliance on the prevailing consumer welfare standard.392
Under that analysis, a particular restraint of trade is procompetitive only if it
alleviates a market failure by increasing consumer surplus, as measured by
lower price or more supply.393 In applying the market failure test, courts have
traditionally assumed the perspective of a single market for an individual
product as it exists today.394 This narrow perspective fails to capture systematic
risks, many of which are inherently future-oriented, such as climate change. This
perspective also does not align well with the perspective of Universal Owners,
who are rationally motivated to reduce the systematic risk in their large and
highly diversified portfolios.395 This conflict is becoming untenable in certain
contexts as large asset managers are increasingly shifting from a “firm-specific”
to “systematic risk” approach in their engagements and proxy campaigns.396 As

388. See Hovenkamp, Antitrust’s Consumer Welfare Principle, supra note 181, at 107 (“While application
of any welfare test poses significant difficulties of measurement, in most close cases estimating consumer
welfare effects is far easier than measuring general welfare effects that require a tradeoff.”).
389. See generally Jill E. Fisch, Making Sustainability Disclosure Sustainable, 107 GEO. L.J. 923 (2019).
390. See, e.g., Aladdin Climate, ALADDIN BY BLACKROCK, https://www.blackrock.com/aladdin
/products/aladdin-climate (last visited July 31, 2022); see Surminski, supra note 95 (describing how insurance
companies use environmental and social factors to assess risk in its underwriting process). See generally Viral
V. Acharya & Thomas Philippon, Measuring Systemic Risk, 30 REV. FIN. STUD. 2, 34 (2017).
391. See supra Part III.
392. See Newman, supra note 217, at 531.
393. Id. There is also an analytical shortcoming to this approach. By fastening the market failure to consumer
welfare, the market failure test becomes indistinguishable from the “type of effect” approach, which also focuses
on impacts on consumers of a specific product, such as price or output.
394. Id.
395. See supra Part IV; see also John C. Coffee, The Coming Shift in Shareholder Activism, From “Firm
Specific” to “Systematic Risk” Proxy Campaigns (and How to Enable Them) (Aug. 26, 2021) (working paper),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3908163 [hereinafter Coffee, The Coming Shift].
396. Coffee, The Coming Shift, supra note 395.
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this Article explored in Part IV, mitigating certain systematic risks requires
competitor collaboration.
To harmonize the current market failure test with the market reality of
concentrated ownership, antitrust must evolve to use a welfare standard that will
account for systematic risks. Antitrust traditionalists point to regulation as the
appropriate vehicle for addressing systematic risks.397 But, as explained above,
regulation is either infeasible, impractical, or cannot respond with sufficient
speed or specificity to anticipate every permutation of competitor
collaboration.398 The Neo-Brandesians, on the other hand, argue that antitrust
ought to address social and environmental externalities, but do not tether this
analysis to the consumer welfare test.399 This Article introduces a pragmatic
approach to resolving this impasse, and introduces a new welfare standard called
“the universal consumer standard.”400 While the universal consumer standard
will require further development, this Article outlines its basic contours.
As a first prong, this Article argues that a competitor collaboration which
seeks to address a systematic risk should always be analyzed under a rule of
reason as opposed to a per se rule, even if the collaboration will necessarily
increase price or reduce output. Given that the per se analysis has been largely
abandoned in practice, this approach is largely consistent with how
antitrust enforcement agencies and courts approach competitor collaboration.401
Nonetheless, clearly articulating that competitor collaboration aimed at
addressing systematic risks will always trigger a rule of reason analysis could
minimize the chilling effect that is preventing competitors from collaborating.
As this Article explained in Part IV, in applying the rule of reason analysis,
courts currently consider three factors: first, whether the plaintiff has shown a
significant anticompetitive effect from the challenged practice; second, whether
the defendant has offered procompetitive reasons to justify these negative
effects; and third, whether the plaintiff has rebutted these procompetitive
justifications by showing that the restraint is not reasonably necessary to
attain the defendant’s objectives.402 Alleviating a market failure can serve as a
procompetitive justification. This Article argues that the market failure should
be analyzed from the perspective of a universal consumer. An initial framework
for the universal consumer standard could allow competitor collaboration if the
parties demonstrate that: (1) the collaboration is designed and narrowly tailored
to mitigate a specifically identified systematic risk; (2) the collaborators’
investors have identified the systematic risk as a focus area through public
397. See Hovenkamp, Progressive Antitrust, supra note 138, at 78.
398. See supra Part IV.
399. See supra Part III.
400. I would like to thank Rick Alexander, the CEO and founder of the Shareholder Commons and Professor
Johnathan Newman for helpful feedback on the universal consumer standard.
401. See, e.g., Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); see also Herbert J. Hovencamp, The
Rule of Reason, 70 FLA. L. REV. 81, 83 (2018) (“Courts evaluate most antitrust claims under a “rule of reason,”
which requires the plaintiff to plead and prove that defendants with market power have engaged in
anticompetitive conduct.”).
402. See Carrier, supra note 243, at 50.
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statements, engagement priorities, shareholder proposals, or proxy voting; (3)
one competitor’s unilateral action will not sufficiently mitigate the systematic
risk; (4) prohibiting the collaboration will reduce the welfare of future
consumers (i.e., decreased supply or increased cost);403 and (5) the universal
consumer welfare exceeds any harm from the collaboration.
There are several benefits to a universal consumer standard along these
lines.404 First, it would not expand antitrust’s purview or require incorporation
of non-welfare concerns or social goals that have no bearing on consumers.
While there is a growing number of scholars who argue that purely social and
non-economic issues should be considered in antitrust analysis, measuring and
weighing them against consumer welfare is challenging. As many have warned,
this “thumb on the scale” for non-economic concerns bears the risk of
devolving into a purely normative exercise, leading to a lack of consistency
in applying antitrust scrutiny to competitor collaboration. 405 In contrast, the
universal consumer standard remains rooted in the consumer welfare paradigm,
which makes consumers the arbiter of whether restraints on trade should be
permitted.
The universal consumer standard also avoids the pitfalls that the total
welfare standard has faced. While there is a resurgent interest in labor antirust
and consumers are in fact also workers, a total welfare analysis has not gained
much traction.406 As commentators have argued, the total welfare standard has
been thwarted by the challenges in measuring total societal welfare. 407 In
contrast, the universal consumer analysis, which considers harms to future
consumers, is far narrower and hence more feasible.
This is particularly so given economists’ increasing focus on the impacts
that climate change, sustainability, and the loss of biodiversity will have on
future generations. This is spurring the development of economic models
that focus on prospective consumer welfare, and account for future harms.408 A
recent example is a “Willingness to Pay” (WTP) standard that Professors Roman
Inderst and Stefan Thomas have proposed, which projects what future

403. While it may be possible to expand the focus beyond a single product, the universal consumer standard
as articulated here refers to welfare impacts on consumers of the same product, or a sustainable version of that
product.
404. While this Article seeks to introduce the universal consumer standard, it acknowledges that the standard
raises many implementation issues. Specifically, the standard will introduce complex geographic and temporal
issues that will need to be fleshed out further.
405. See Hovenkamp, Progressive Antitrust, supra note 138, at 79.
406. There is a long-standing debate on whether the total welfare standard should replace the consumer
welfare standard. See, e.g., Barak Orbach, The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox, 7 J. COMP. L. &
ECON. 149–79 (2007).
407. See, e.g., Peter J. Hammer, Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market Failures, Total Welfare, and the
Challenge of Intramarket Second-Best Tradeoffs, 98 MICH. L. REV. 849, 850 (2000).
408. See e.g., Roman Inderst & Stefan Thomas, Prospective Welfare Analysis—Extending Willingness-toPay Assessment to Embracing Sustainability, J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. (Sept. 2021) (explaining how a future
change in consumers’ willingness-to-pay can be accounted for in a consumer welfare effects analysis in
antitrust.).
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consumers would be willing to pay for a sustainable product.409 This Article is
not advocating for the WTP standard, per se. However, the WTP standard
illustrates the growing interest in welfare accounting that considers future harms.
To illustrate the universal consumer standard, consider the following
hypothetical. The loss of biodiversity threatens the long-term sustainability of
an increasing number of products in the food industry. Universal owners
invested in the food industry have identified the loss of biodiversity as a
systematic risk. For example, BlackRock has identified the loss of biodiversity
as a key engagement priority in an effort to protect the “natural capital” in its
portfolio.410 This is not all too surprising given that, by some estimates, half of
the world’s global GDP (an estimated forty-two trillion dollars) depends on
preserving biodiversity.411 Imagine now that a group of competitors in the food
industry wants to reduce soy bean output in order to forestall deforestation,
which is accelerating the loss of biodiversity. This competitor collaboration will
reduce soybean supply and increase soybean price. Applying a universal
consumer standard to this collaboration, the competitors can demonstrate that
this output restriction and resulting price increase is in fact procompetitive
because it ensures continued soy production for future generations.
B. HOW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, COURTS, AND CONGRESS CAN ADVANCE
THE UNIVERSAL CONSUMER STANDARD
This Article has introduced the universal consumer standard as a concept
that will align the consumer welfare standard with universal ownership. This
Part concludes by exploring how antitrust enforcement agencies, courts, and
Congress can define and implement that standard.
1. The DOJ and FTC Should Update the Antitrust Guidelines for
Collaboration Among Competitors.
The DOJ and FTC should initiate a public debate on whether and how
competition policy is preventing companies from addressing systematic
risks that will harm future consumers.412 The agencies then should update their
guidelines for competitor collaboration and incorporate a universal consumer
perspective into that analysis.413
Issuing updated guidance is consistent with how the DOJ and FTC have
responded to shifting policy priorities in the past. For example, when President
Obama issued a statement stressing that “[c]yber threats pose one the gravest
409. Id.
410. Chris Flood, BlackRock Steps Up Drive to Protect Natural Environment, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2021),
https://www.ft.com/content/11285871-f0a7-4573-b638-5391e713eac8.
411. A Fifth of Countries Worldwide at Risk from Ecosystem Collapse as Biodiversity Declines, Reveals
Pioneering Swiss Re Index, SWISS RE (Sept. 23, 2020), https://www.swissre.com/media/news-releases/nr20200923-biodiversity-and-ecosystems-services.html.
412. See supra Part IV.
413. Of course, this will require the agencies conduct workshops and studies, to hear from experts, and to
develop the necessary knowledge and to refine their guidance.
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national security dangers that the United States faces,” 414 the DOJ and FTC
issued an “Antitrust Policy Statement on Sharing of Cybersecurity
Information.” 415 This joint statement acknowledged that antitrust could be
unwittingly chilling valuable collaboration: “private entities may, however, be
hesitant to share cyber threat information with others, especially competitors,
because they believe such sharing may raise antitrust issues.”416 To further the
policy goal of a “more secure and productive nation,” 417 the DOJ and FTC
delineated the contours of information that would be permissible under antitrust
policy. Relying on United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,418 the agencies
also clarified that they would impose a rule of reason analysis to information
sharing in the context of cybersecurity in light of the public policy goal.419
On January 27, 2021, President Biden issued an executive order that begins
with a commitment to put “the climate crisis at the center of United States
Foreign Policy and National Security.”420 Crucially, the administration has also
stressed that climate justice and economic justice are dependent upon
one another.421 The same day, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin committed to
“immediately take appropriate policy actions to prioritize climate change
considerations in our activities and risk assessments, to mitigate this driver of
insecurity.”422 Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen also responded by creating a new
senior treasury post for a “Climate Czar” to mitigate the risks to the financial
system posed by climate change.423
U.S. antitrust enforcement agencies must recognize the unique role that
competition policy plays in advancing the administration’s policy goals by
issuing guidelines for competitor collaboration that account for the impact of
current activities on future consumers.
2.

The DOJ & FTC Should Extend the Fast-Tracked Review Process

414. Press Release, White House Off. of the Press Sec’y, Statement by the President on the Cybersecurity
Framework (Feb. 12, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/02/12/statementpresident-cybersecurity-framework.
415. See Dep’t of Just. & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n: Antitrust Policy
Statement on Sharing of Cybersecurity Information (2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
public_statements/297681/140410ftcdojcyberthreatstmt.pdf.
416. See id.
417. See id.
418. 438 U.S. 422, 422 (1978).
419. See id.
420. See Exec. Order No. 14008, 86 Fed. Reg. 7,619, 7,620, 7,631 (Jan. 27, 2021) (urging “comprehensive
attention to environmental justice throughout the Department of Justice” and promises to “develop a climate
finance plan” but makes no mention of antitrust policy).
421. See id.
422. See Aaron Mehta, Climate Change Is Now a National Security Priority for the Pentagon,
DEFENSENEWS (Jan. 27, 2021), https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2021/01/27/climate-change-is-now-anational-security-priority-for-the-pentagon.
423. See Kate Davidson, Yellen Is Creating a New Senior Treasury Post for Climate Czar, WALL ST. J. (Feb.
12, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/yellen-is-creating-a-new-senior-treasury-post-for-climate-czar-11613
138479.
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for the COVID-19 Pandemic to Collaboration to Address Climate
Change.
In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the DOJ and FTC sprang into
action and issued a fast-tracked review process for collaborations among
corporate competitors seeking to advance health and safety. 424 The agencies
pledged to respond to applications within a week, whereas the standard process
takes several months.425 The United States was not alone; competition agencies
from Europe to Asia and South America have tried to support, or at least not
obstruct, the pandemic response. 426 The United Kingdom, for example,
temporarily relaxed competition rules to help the dairy industry avoid waste and
sustain productive capacity by allowing dairy producers to share information
like surplus milk quantities and stock levels.427
But U.S. agencies have specifically limited their guidance to joint efforts
“to address the spread of COVID-19 and its aftermath.”428 This Article argues
that climate change deserves the same level of exigency and warrants a fasttracked review process. For competitor collaborations that seek to address
systematic risks, the DOJ and FTC should incorporate the universal consumer
standard into their analysis.

3.

Courts and Antitrust Enforcement Agencies Should Recognize the
Procompetitive Justifications Underlying Competitor Collaboration
to Address Sustainability.

The Sherman Act’s broad wording has left courts with wide latitude to
define procompetitive justifications for competitor collaboration. Although they
have already largely abandoned the per se analysis,429 courts and enforcement
agencies should recognize that addressing systematic risk serves a valid
procompetitive purpose. This is true even if the activity involves traditionally
per se illegal categories, such as price-fixing and group boycotts. This will
require courts and enforcement agencies to consider the economic benefits

424. See DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, JOINT ANTITRUST STATEMENT REGARDING COVID-19
(March
2020),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1569593/statement_on_
coronavirus_ftc-doj-3-24-20.pdf.
425. See id.
426. See generally Impact of COVID-19 New Exemptions Under Antitrust Law, LATHAM & WATKINS (Feb
1, 2021), https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/covid-19-impact-new-exemptions-under-antitrust-law; see
also supra Part IV.
427. See LATHAM & WATKINS, supra note 426, at 7.
428. See DEP'T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 424 at 2.
429. See supra Part III.
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of any prosocial collaboration from a universal consumer perspective. 430 For
example, if the prosocial collaboration raises prices for current consumers but
ensures the long-term sustainability and supply of the produce for future
consumers, then the activity should be permitted to proceed as procompetitive.
This will, of course, require more robust externality accounting grounded in
natural resource and environmental economics as opposed to the neoclassical
economics that discounts scarcity.431 As noted above, courts can readily rely on
existing economic models that account for prospective consumer welfare.
4.

Congress Should Pass Legislation that Authorizes the DOJ and FTC
to Oversee Temporary Collaboration Safe Harbors.

While fast-tracking the review process is a good start, it may not go far
enough to ensure that competition enforcement is not stifling companies’ ability
to address systematic risks. To that end, Congress should pass legislation
requiring the DOJ and FTC, or another agency such as the EPA, to provide a
safe harbor for competitor collaboration that addresses systematic
environmental and social risks. The contours of that exemption will emerge out
of a consultative process, but global competition authorities offer some recent
examples.
On July 9, 2020, the Netherlands Authority for Consumers and
Markets (ACM) was the first in the European Union to publish draft guidelines
containing a proposed approach to addressing sustainability agreements.432 The
Draft Guidelines would exempt agreements where sustainability benefits
outweigh the anticompetitive effects. The Dutch Guidelines are bold in at least
two respects. First, they do not require quantitative evidence of sustainability
benefits if the companies involved in the agreement represent less than 30% of
combined market share. Second, they take into account the benefits of the
agreements for future consumers—a perspective that is consistent with the
universal consumer standard.
Similarly, Greek competition authorities have proposed the use
of a regulatory “sandbox” in which companies can collaborate with
competitors to advance sustainability goals under the supervision

430. See, e.g., Reed Hundt, Companies Colluding to Fight Climate Change Don’t Need to Worry About
Antitrust Laws, WASH. POST (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/09/11/
companies-colluding-fight-climate-change-dont-need-worry-about-antitrust-laws (discussing an opinion from
former chair of the FCC advocating for private firms to bring a test case to define the contours of prosocial
collaboration and clarify that addressing climate change should count).
431. See generally Elmar Altvater, The Capitalocene, or, Geoenginering Against Capitalism’s Planetary
Boundaries, in ANTHROPOCENE OR CAPITALOCENCE? NATURE, HISTORY, AND THE CRISIS OF CAPITALISM, 138–
52 (Jason W. Moore ed., 2016) (“Today’s great questions are about how capitalism works through, and actively
creates, planetary nature.”).
432. See Emma Cochrane, Sima Ostrovsky & Lodewick Prompers, Dutch Competition Regulator Leads the
Way on Sustainability, LINKLATERS (July 14, 2020), https://www.linklaters.com/en-us/insights/blogs/
linkingcompetition/2020/july/dutch-competition-regulator-leads-the-way-on-sustainability.
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of the competition authority.433 Yet another example comes from Australia’s
competition authorities (the ACCC), which have long had the authority to
exempt competitor collaboration if the public benefits outweigh the public
detriments. The ACCC has recently applied this exemption to sustainability
collaborations, including a five-year exemption for a voluntary, industry-led
initiative to address the disposal of used batteries.434
The regulatory agencies would be tasked with determining the scope and
duration of any safe harbor. But those agencies will need to acquire more robust
expertise in environmental economics to ensure that the procompetitive
justifications for these competitor collaborations can be adequately measured.
Moreover, any antitrust safe harbor would have to be closely monitored with
sunset provisions. This activity-specific exception will undoubtedly trigger
increased enforcement and monitoring costs as well. Congress appears poised to
increase funding for antitrust enforcement. This Article argues that Congress
should also allocate funding for the oversight of prosocial collaboration.435
CONCLUSION
Universal owners are demanding that companies address systemic risks.
Corporate managers must respond to these calls—this is an economic
imperative. But companies recognize that they cannot make meaningful
progress unilaterally. Antitrust law currently prevents or discourages companies
from working together to address systematic environmental and social risks,
leading to an impasse.
This Article sheds light on the growing tension between antitrust law and
the demands on companies today. It also takes the first step toward harmonizing
antitrust law with these market realities by introducing the contours of a new
standard: the universal consumer standard. In doing so, this Article invites
additional research—both qualitative and quantitative—on how antitrust law
can accommodate prosocial collaboration.

433. See David Little & Pierre Bichet, Greek Sustainability Initiative Promotes Cooperation Between
Competitors, JD SUPRA (Oct. 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/greek-sustainability-initiative-31046/;
see also Competition Law & Sustainability, HELLENIC COMPETITION COMM’N, https://www.epant.gr/en/
enimerosi/competition-law-sustainability.html (last visited July 31, 2022); Sustainability and Competition Note
by Greece, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND Dev. (Dec. 1, 2020), https://one.oecd.org/document/
DAF/COMP/WD(2020)64/en/pdf.
434. Battery Stewardship Council, AUSTL. COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMM’N (Mar. 1, 2020),
https://www.accc.gov.au/public-registers/authorisations-and-notifications-registers/authorisations-register
/battery-stewardship-council.
435. See The Competition and Antitrust Law Enforcement Reform Act of 2021, 117th Cong. § 15 (2021)
(arguing that it is possible to design the oversight so that it is coordinated with a different agency, such as the
EPA for prosocial environmental collaboration, similar to the FDA’s oversight of the Capper-Volstead Act;
another option is having multi-stakeholder oversight to incorporate the perspective of experts from academia
and NGOs).

